France Makes Its Choice: Morocco as the Gateway to Africa
Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas, Progress Center for Policies — London
Following the loss of much of its relationships and influence in Africa, the announcement of a strategic treaty between France and Morocco reflects a fundamental shift in Paris’s approach — elevating Rabat to the status of a strategic priority and new entry point into the African continent.
Part One: The Facts
On May 20, 2026, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and his French counterpart Jean-Noël Barrot announced at a joint press conference in Rabat that King Mohammed VI will make a state visit to Paris, during which the “Franco-Moroccan Treaty” will be signed.
Bourita described the treaty as “an unprecedented political, legal, and historical event.” The French side confirmed it is the first treaty France has concluded with a country outside Europe, designed to establish a strategic framework for bilateral relations extending over the coming decades. It is equally the first treaty Morocco has concluded with a European country at this level.
The Moroccan king’s visit had been postponed several times, originally expected following President Macron’s visit to Rabat in October 2024, when an “enhanced exceptional partnership” was announced and 22 agreements worth approximately €10 billion were signed, covering defence, aviation, the economy, and security.
On October 28, 2024, Macron’s visit to Morocco marked a major turning point, with France officially recognising Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara — significantly improving bilateral relations.
The treaty announcement came just days after French Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin’s visit to Algeria, focused on judicial and security cooperation and unresolved files including the recovery of looted assets — considered a step toward gradual normalisation between France and Algeria.
Moroccan sources indicate the king’s visit carries a geostrategic dimension in light of France’s losses in Africa, and that Paris — as Macron has stated — seeks to return to Africa through investment in Morocco’s southern territories and the African Atlantic Initiative launched by the king.
The same sources suggest France and the EU are keen to develop their African relationships through Morocco, which possesses deep-rooted networks and strategies across the continent — particularly in North and West Africa — meaning the treaty corrects the imbalance in French-European trade relations with Africa and establishes new foundations for that relationship.
French sources acknowledge that Paris has reviewed its African policies after recognising the damage caused by its previous approach. Morocco, which holds the largest investment footprint in West Africa, is seen as the most appropriate gateway for France’s return to the continent.
Moroccan sources note the treaty reflects shifts in Rabat’s diplomatic doctrine in recent years — moving away from an exclusive relationship with France toward diversified partnerships encompassing the United States (particularly in defence and security), China, India, and others in trade and investment.
European sources suggest the French-European movement is driven by an effort to absorb major international shifts — tensions with Washington, a reassessment of relations with Moscow, and growing Chinese influence globally — meaning Paris and its allies now face an urgent need to act to secure their global interests, with Africa as a central pillar.
Moroccan sources stress that Morocco will not act as a guarantor of French-African relations, but that the initiatives Morocco advances for Africa could serve as an entry point for the continent if France, Europe, and others genuinely change their political culture toward Africa — moving toward real investment rather than exploitation.
Information indicates that preparations for this treaty predated the recent security developments in Mali.
Moroccan sources note that bilateral relations must take into account the interests of competing powers in Africa, including the United States, China, Russia, Turkey, Israel, and others.
Part Two: Analysis
Analysts observe that the treaty represents a qualitative upgrade of the relationship — from an ordinary partnership to a long-term strategic framework encompassing political, security, military, and economic cooperation.
The treaty reflects a geopolitical shift in North Africa, with France deepening its partnership with Morocco — its primary economic partner on the continent — in an exceptional manner.
Observers note the treaty contrasts with the trajectory of French-Algerian relations: France deepens its strategic partnership with Morocco, including support on the Western Sahara file, while limiting itself to modest security and judicial engagement with Algeria.
The treaty’s European dimension reinforces Morocco’s international standing — particularly in Africa — by adopting Moroccan African initiatives as a framework for European engagement on the continent. It may also encourage other African states to deepen their partnerships with Morocco.
Experts in African affairs note that a treaty between stable states will encounter the reality of unstable and volatile African countries, which allows many actors to enter the region — exacerbating instability and placing practical limits on the treaty’s impact.
Experts question whether regional and international powers with interests in Africa will allow this French-Moroccan investment or will instead impose competing conditions and counter-partnerships.
Experts acknowledge uncertainty about whether West African states that have soured on France are prepared to improve those relations — whether through Morocco or under the treaty’s momentum — despite Rabat’s extensive relationships in the region.
The treaty may have implications for the balance of power — particularly in the Sahel — and could conflict with the trajectory of French-Algerian normalisation while potentially unsettling Morocco’s neighbouring states.
Conclusion
The strategic treaty between France and Morocco sets a precedent between a European and an African state, and reveals Paris’s decisive choice in favour of Morocco in North Africa.
Following a review of its previous policies, France seeks to repair its African relationships through Morocco’s gateway and its continental networks.
The treaty’s European dimension reinforces Morocco’s international standing — particularly in Africa — by adopting Moroccan African initiatives as its framework.
The treaty is built on Morocco’s diversified global relationships rather than its former exclusive dependency on France, and on a French acknowledgement of current international shifts.
It rests on Paris’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, strengthening Rabat’s international position on this issue.
Morocco will not act as a sponsor of France’s new African relationships, but will serve as an entry point — contingent on a genuine change in France’s political culture toward the continent.
The treaty’s success depends on how it accommodates international competition within Africa and whether regional and international players support or obstruct it.
The treaty may have implications for the balance of power in the Sahel, noting that preparations predated recent events in Mali.
It may conflict with the trajectory of French-Algerian normalisation and could provoke unease among Morocco’s neighbours.