Policy Brief – Progress Center for Policies
Some observers of Syrian affairs have raised concerns about the international stance on the presence of foreign fighters—some in leadership roles—within the military and security structures under the new regime in Damascus. What is the current state and scale of this phenomenon? What are the international positions, and how is this issue perceived domestically in Syria?
Details:
On May 15, reports surfaced that General Security units in Idlib and Hama launched a broad campaign targeting foreign fighters of Arab and other nationalities, marking an escalation against hardline factions.
The operations involved coordinated and quiet raids with no clashes. Among those arrested were Palestinians, Egyptians, Tunisians, and others of unknown nationalities, suspected of affiliation with terrorist groups. Notably arrested was Palestinian leader Shamil al-Ghazzi, known for his role in the “Red Brigades,” radical rhetoric, and past ties to ISIS in Libya and Egypt.
On May 16, the Syrian Ministry of Interior denied the campaign, calling such reports entirely false and confirming no such operations were conducted by the ministry or its security agencies.
While no official statistics exist, observers estimate there are around 2,500 foreign fighters in Syria, excluding their families. Many experts argue their overall impact is limited when compared to the scale of native Syrian personnel in the state’s military and security forces.
Syrian analysts argue the foreign fighter issue is being used by opponents of the new regime—both domestically and internationally—to undermine its legitimacy. This has intensified under growing international, particularly U.S., scrutiny.
The U.S. has not demanded their expulsion, but insists they not be given leadership roles in military or government structures. While some foreign fighters were previously promoted within the newly formed army, appointments have since stopped—interpreted as a concession to domestic and external pressures.
Studies on Abu Mohammad al-Julani’s trajectory show he rejected allegiance to both ISIS and al-Qaeda, eventually focusing on a nationalist Syrian agenda. Foreign fighters who remained within Tahrir al-Sham accepted this “Syrianization” and refrained from pursuing transnational jihadist agendas.
Observers highlight a deep-rooted human instinct to resist outsiders, noting even developed societies struggle with the integration of foreigners. Notably, some in Damascus have even called for the removal of “strangers” from the capital—not foreigners, but Syrians from provinces like Idlib.
Some Syrian voices argue that foreign fighters were partners in the victory over the previous regime, and removing them now would be morally wrong, especially given their popularity among segments of the population supportive of the regime change.
In March 2025, remnants of the old regime attempted a failed coup in the coastal region, highlighting the regime’s need to retain all available loyal fighting forces, including foreigners.
Security and defense experts argue the problem lies not in their foreign origin, but in whether they adhere to state directives. They cite examples from around the world, including the French Foreign Legion and similar units in Arab states, where foreigners serve in national security forces.
The anticipated lifting of U.S. sanctions by President Donald Trump, and Syria’s re-entry into the global economy, is expected to shift focus away from this issue, while deterring internal actors and forcing Israel to reassess its military approach to Syria.
Damascus is reportedly taking foreign concerns seriously. It is engaging in talks with Egypt and China regarding Egyptian and Uyghur fighters, respectively, to address their concerns.
While some reports claimed that former Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa intended to grant Syrian citizenship to foreign fighters, a review of his statement clarified that he was only referring to a limited group—those who had lived in Syria for years, married Syrian women, and had supported the revolution.
Key Takeaways:
Foreign conditions for engagement with Syria do not demand the expulsion of foreign fighters, but rather emphasize that they should not hold leadership roles and must not act against foreign nations from Syrian territory.
International actors increasingly recognize that the issue is exaggerated, as foreign fighters represent a small and manageable proportion of Syria’s military structure and largely follow government policy.
Domestically, the topic serves as a political tool for criticizing the new regime—used especially by remnants of the old regime to provoke public sentiment.
Foreign fighters reportedly enjoy significant popularity among certain constituencies that are grateful for their role in overthrowing the previous government, suggesting any move against them could provoke a domestic backlash.
Experts note that many nations—including France and Arab states—incorporate foreign nationals into their armed forces, suggesting that presence alone is not an anomaly.
Damascus is engaging in diplomatic consultations to allay international concerns and is committed to ensuring these fighters do not pose external threats.
Given Syria’s fragile post-conflict environment, the regime is unlikely to dismantle any component of its defensive apparatus, including foreign fighters.
With economic reintegration on the horizon after U.S. sanctions are lifted, the foreign fighter issue is expected to become a secondary concern in a shifting international narrative around Syria.
