Europe and Sudan: Economic Siege on Gold and Political Hesitation on Designation

Policy Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman, Progress Center for Policies,

Introduction: The European Union has escalated its tools for dealing with the war in Sudan through two different institutions and at closely timed intervals. The European Parliament, in a non-binding political position, called for designating the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a terrorist organization, and for the first time named the United Arab Emirates as a party contributing to fueling the conflict. In contrast, the Council of the European Union — the body authorized to make binding decisions — limited itself to imposing restrictions on imports of Sudanese gold and exports of materials linked to the mining sector, without adopting a terrorist designation for the RSF or making any reference to the UAE.

This divergence between the parliamentary position and the executive decision reflects the limits of consensus within the EU on how to handle the Sudanese crisis. It also indicates that the track of drying up the war’s funding sources through economic sanctions enjoys greater consensus and a higher chance of implementation than the track of politically designating the RSF as a terrorist organization, which still lacks sufficient European consensus for adoption.

The Facts
First: The European Parliament’s Decision
On Thursday, July 9, 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by a vote of 476 to 28, with 96 abstentions, condemning the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sudan, with particular focus on violations linked to the RSF’s siege of El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state. The resolution called on member states to halt all forms of support for the RSF, especially arms supplies, and demanded that the EU add the organization to its list of terrorist organizations, alongside imposing targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for attacks against civilians and on a specific Emirati company, conducting an independent international investigation into war crimes, and expanding the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction to cover all of Sudanese territory. The resolution represents a notable shift in European institutional language, as it explicitly named the United Arab Emirates for the first time as a party contributing to fueling the war, after European institutions had avoided this naming since the conflict erupted in 2023.

Second: The Council of the European Union’s Decision
During a meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels on Monday, July 13, 2026, the Council of the European Union decided to strengthen the sanctions regime imposed on Sudan by banning the purchase, import, or transport of gold originating from Sudan, and banning the sale, supply, or export of mercury and cyanide to it — two substances widely used in gold mining and extraction operations. The decision exempted cases of a humanitarian nature, public health emergencies, and disaster response from this ban. The decision came on a Dutch-French initiative, building on the sanctions regime in place since October 2023, which covers 18 individuals and 8 entities, including RSF deputy commander Abdul Rahim Dagalo, and which was extended until October 10, 2026.

The Council justified this step on the grounds that gold has become a major source of financing for the war, as the RSF is accused of smuggling large quantities of gold to the United Arab Emirates and Kenya to finance arms purchases and the hiring of mercenaries. It should be noted that the Council did not adopt the European Parliament’s recommendation to add the RSF to the list of terrorist organizations, nor did its statement make any reference to the United Arab Emirates.

Analysis
1. The War Economy Track: The Most Feasible for Immediate Implementation
The ban on gold, mercury, and cyanide represents the most realistic and immediately applicable European step, as it was issued by the body with direct executive authority and does not require additional political consensus beyond what has already been achieved among member states. This track links economic and legal pressure, directly targeting one of the RSF’s most important funding sources by narrowing gold export channels and complicating access to the chemicals needed for its extraction. However, the effectiveness of this ban remains contingent on the RSF’s ability to redirect gold smuggling routes through non-European markets, particularly via the UAE and Kenya, which could limit the practical impact of the sanctions unless accompanied by parallel pressure on transit and receiving countries.

2. The Terrorist Designation Track: A Political Recommendation Pending Council Decision
The European Parliament’s request to designate the RSF as a terrorist organization has no actual legal effect unless adopted by the Council of the European Union through the applicable procedures — which had not happened as of the July 13 decision, despite the close timing of the two dates. Should this designation be adopted in the future, it would entail freezing the organization’s assets and funds within the EU, banning any direct or indirect financing or financial or logistical support for it, criminalizing the provision of material support or services by European individuals and companies, along with tightening travel restrictions on its leaders and strengthening European security and intelligence cooperation to pursue its financing and arms networks.

Politically, the designation, if adopted, would reduce the RSF’s international legitimacy and limit the scope for official contact with it, thereby strengthening the Sudanese government’s position in its efforts to diplomatically isolate it, and could prompt other states and international partners to consider similar steps as a political and legal precedent. However, the Council’s hesitation so far to adopt this step, despite the Parliament’s explicit recommendation, points to internal European political and diplomatic calculations that prevent translating political condemnation into executive action — most likely due to the sensitivity of relations with regional parties connected to the file.

3. Naming the UAE: The Most Significant Shift in European Institutional Language
The European Parliament’s explicit naming of the United Arab Emirates — for the first time since 2023 — constitutes a development whose political significance exceeds that of both the sanctions and terrorist designation issues combined, as it shifts European institutional discourse from general condemnation of foreign interference to identifying specific parties by name. However, the Council of the European Union’s refusal to repeat this naming in its July 13 decision, despite coming just four days after the Parliament’s decision, reveals a clear gap between the two positions, and indicates that the executive body remains unwilling to match the more explicit political language adopted by the Parliament, at least at this stage.

Conclusions

The steps taken on July 9 and July 13 fall within an escalating European policy toward the war in Sudan, but they simultaneously reveal a structural divergence between two European institutions: a Parliament advancing a bolder political language, including naming regional parties and calling for terrorist designation, and a Council that has so far limited itself to narrower — though more immediately implementable — economic and legal measures.

The most likely track in the near term is a continued deepening of economic sanctions on the war economy, while the track of terrorist designation and verbal escalation toward the regional actors supporting the RSF remains contingent on further developments on the ground or politically, which could push member states toward a consensus not yet achieved.