Policy Paper Summary, African Affairs Unit, Progress Center for Policies
In the complex political landscape of the Horn of Africa, the Eritrean regime’s approach to nation-building follows a singular and harsh principle: Eritrean nationalism thrives by weakening the Tigray ethnicity—and, by extension, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—while actively working to eliminate its political presence in the region. This policy remains the central axis of Eritrea’s domestic and foreign strategies, reflecting a deep contradiction between power consolidation and regional stability. Although Tigray is a region within Ethiopia, the Eritrean regime’s obsessive focus on undermining this ethnicity—despite its social and ethnic commonalities with Eritreans—is evident through repeated atrocities, forced military conscription, and the systematic denial of fundamental rights, including the absence of a constitution and free elections.
When Eritrean officials are questioned about the absence of a constitution, the indefinite nature of military service, or the mass migration of citizens, they invariably cite the same justification: the perpetual threat of the “Weyane”—a shorthand for the TPLF. This term has become a catch-all excuse for grievances against Tigray. Even the mayor of Asmara, when asked about restrictions on home renovations, echoed the same accusation. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, who has ruled since independence, continues to justify his prolonged grip on power by invoking the alleged threat posed by the TPLF. This ideological fixation goes beyond merely weakening Tigray—it seeks to diminish its influence entirely. As a result, Eritrea’s resources, population, and development have been held hostage to this obsession, with Eritreans paying the ultimate price.
The Tigrayan people and the TPLF have repeatedly sought reconciliation with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Notably, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi facilitated the referendum that led to Eritrea’s independence, despite internal opposition within Ethiopia. However, these efforts proved futile against Afwerki’s entrenched hostility toward Tigray, which he perceives as an existential threat to his rule.
When conflict erupted in 2021 between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government, Eritrea swiftly launched a campaign it framed as retaliatory. Under the guise of national defense, international reports documented Eritrean forces engaging in widespread destruction of agricultural infrastructure, roads, water facilities, residential complexes, and healthcare centers in Tigray—actions that went beyond conventional warfare and have been described as systematic ethnic genocide.
Following the 2023 Pretoria Agreement, which sought to end the war between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, tensions escalated further. Rather than welcoming peace, Eritrea viewed the agreement as an insult, interpreting it as proof that the TPLF had not been decisively defeated. The Eritrean regime, enraged that its long-standing objective remained unfulfilled, intensified its hostile rhetoric against Ethiopia, insisting that true regional security required the complete eradication of the TPLF and its political influence.
One of the most perplexing developments is Eritrea’s recent shift toward feigned concern for the Tigrayan people. After years of open hostility and efforts to dismantle any bridges of cooperation, the Eritrean leadership now postures as a mediator in Tigray’s political future. This contradiction is stark: while Eritrea’s core policy remains deeply antagonistic toward Tigray, its leaders now attempt to exert influence under the pretense of goodwill.
Sources close to the TPLF accuse Afwerki of new maneuvers, including recruiting elements within the TPLF to serve his agenda and inciting internal divisions. These actions, they argue, expose Eritrea’s real goal: perpetuating inter-ethnic conflict while masquerading as a neutral actor.
Looking Ahead:
Eritrea’s persistent hostility toward Tigray, a defining feature of its state policy for decades, raises fundamental questions about nations that build their political doctrines on entrenched hatred. Such an approach leaves no room for shared interests, historical ties, or cultural cooperation. This trajectory threatens regional stability and has confounded analysts monitoring the Horn of Africa, who question why Asmara continues to scapegoat Tigray and Ethiopia for its own political and economic failures. Rather than adapting its policies, the Eritrean regime has clung to an unchanging narrative, using external threats to justify authoritarian rule while avoiding accountability.
Amid global and regional transformations and the erosion of the post-World War II international order, fostering regional cooperation has become more urgent than ever. It is time to move beyond zero-sum politics and reject the false choice between ethnic identity and human rights. Violence cannot replace governance, nor can revenge substitute for reconciliation. Eritrea’s continued hostility toward Tigray has cost thousands of lives, drained resources, and stunted development—an approach that serves neither the regime nor the region’s long-term stability.
Revisiting Eritrea’s relationship with Ethiopia within a framework of cooperation is not an unrealistic prospect. Historical documents attributed to Afwerki from his time as Secretary-General of the EPLF suggest that he once advocated for Ethiopia’s unity and opposed ethnic federalism. Reports from former Eritrean Defense Minister Mesfin Hagos, along with records from Ethiopia’s Derg regime, indicate that Afwerki was open to a federal arrangement linking Eritrea to Ethiopia—a proposal that was ultimately rejected by Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1985. Some analyses suggest that this rejection thwarted Afwerki’s ambitions to govern Ethiopia, leading him to pursue armed struggle and secession instead. If so, the Eritrean regime’s persistent hostility toward Tigray is entirely misplaced.
Conclusion:
– Eritrea’s prolonged antagonism toward the Tigrayan people and its ongoing tensions with Ethiopia have long outlived their utility as tools for regime survival. With political and economic crises mounting and shifting regional alliances offering diminishing returns, the Eritrean government’s reliance on external enemies as existential threats has become unsustainable.
– Eritrean elites—both domestically and in the diaspora—must recognize the dangers of this aggressive trajectory. It not only threatens regional stability but also jeopardizes Eritrea’s own future. As global and regional dynamics evolve, it is increasingly clear that lasting peace can only be achieved through genuine reconciliation, built on mutual interests, respect for human rights, and the rejection of ethnic hatred as state policy.
