El-Sisi in Djibouti: Completing the Encirclement of Ethiopia and Preparing for a Possible Ground Operation in Yemen
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Establishment of a Military Base and Egyptian Logistical Support in Doraleh
Policy Brief: African Affairs Unit – Progress Center for Policies
There is political merit in describing Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s visit to Djibouti on April 24 as historic. The visit carried clear strategic messages, completing Cairo’s regional encirclement of Ethiopia amid ongoing tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Notably, the arrival of an Egyptian Arabic music band to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Umm Kulthum’s death could not mask the arrival of three Egyptian Air Force C-130H aircraft carrying military equipment, according to international and Egyptian media sources.
Details:
On October 10, 2024, the presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia signed military-oriented agreements. This came after a January 2024 MoU between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region, allowing Ethiopia to establish a naval base in Berbera in exchange for diplomatic recognition—a move opposed by Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt. These nations maintain that Somaliland’s independence is illegitimate, even after 26 years of de facto autonomy under leaders like Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, unrecognized internationally.
While Egypt and Djibouti have remained discreet about the real purpose of the 150,000-square-meter port granted to Egypt in Doraleh, it is widely understood to be a military base, adding to the six other foreign military installations in Djibouti. The joint statement by El-Sisi and President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh described the port as a “logistics hub for Egyptian companies to boost trade with Djibouti and access regional markets.”
These agreements raised alarms in Addis Ababa. Doraleh is crucial, handling around 95% of Ethiopia’s trade. Recently, Djibouti has taken hostile steps to expel thousands of illegal Ethiopian immigrants, a move Ethiopia views as aggressive and deliberately disruptive to bilateral ties. Cairo’s alignment with Djibouti is seen as a direct challenge to the Ethiopian-Somaliland deal and as a return to historic tribal rivalries. Djibouti is also accused of backing the extremist group Al-Shabaab, which once controlled Mogadishu under Sheikh Sharif.
Another layer of Egyptian concern lies in securing Red Sea shipping routes via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, disrupted by Houthi attacks in Yemen, which have caused Egypt significant losses due to interruptions in international trade. The phrase “rejection of destabilizing practices” in the joint communiqué is interpreted as a veiled reference to both the Houthis and Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions. Some Western observers believe Egypt’s move to establish a military presence in Djibouti may be in preparation for a future international ground operation to remove the Houthis from power, following the failure of airstrikes to stop attacks on shipping.
The joint statement emphasized the rejection of any actions that could threaten Red Sea navigation and called for activating the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to enhance regional coordination.
In clear signals regarding Somalia, the presidents rejected the Ethiopia-Somaliland Berbera agreement, affirming support for Somalia’s unity, sovereignty, and government control over all its territory. They also addressed Sudan, stating opposition to any attempts to undermine Sudan’s unity, including the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) plan to form a parallel government from Nyala in South Darfur.
Potential Ethiopian Response:
Ethiopian media reacted by framing El-Sisi’s visit and agreements as an effort to isolate and limit Ethiopia’s regional influence and maritime access. Ethiopia may seek alternatives to Djibouti’s ports—critical for its water supply and trade—by doubling down on Berbera in Somaliland, which controls 850 km² of Red Sea coastline.
Additionally, Ethiopia may stir unrest in Djibouti through the Afar ethnic group, the second-largest in the country, opposing the ruling Issa clan led by President Guelleh. Unofficial Ethiopian outlets have suggested that Egypt’s efforts will fail and might trigger widespread chaos in the Horn of Africa. For Ethiopia, access to the sea is existential, and it may even consider building another dam on the Blue Nile to pressure Egypt by targeting its vital water source.
Conclusion:
• Egypt recognizes the strategic danger of instability in the Horn of Africa. El-Sisi’s visit aims to deepen security and defense ties amid the Bab el-Mandeb conflict, which threatens Egypt’s national security and Suez Canal revenues.
• Cairo is tightening its diplomatic encirclement of Ethiopia by strengthening ties with its regional neighbors—Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti—as Ethiopia desperately seeks a maritime outlet. This amounts to a geopolitical standoff: Nile waters versus access to the sea.
• Experts warn that the Red Sea situation, combined with a potential ground war in Yemen to remove the Houthis, could escalate into a broader regional conflict.
• A key driver of tension is Egypt’s base in Djibouti, which aims to counter Ethiopia’s Berbera deal. Notably, the United States under Donald Trump has shown no opposition to Ethiopia’s presence in Berbera, contrasting with the previous Biden administration, which rejected it.
