Egypt’s Approach to Red Sea Security: Regional “Exclusivity” and External Interventions
Policy Paper by Dr. Mohamad Kawas
Progress Center for Policies
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Executive Summary
• Cairo’s position reflects a strategic awareness of the importance of Red Sea littoral states’ sovereignty over the region’s security, balance, and stability.
• Egypt rejects both regional and international—Western and Eastern—interventions aimed at dominating the maritime corridor.
• Cairo seeks to establish a local bloc limited to coastal states to oppose any imposed faits accomplis in the Red Sea.
• The Egyptian “campaign” primarily targets Israeli interventions and expansion toward the Red Sea.
• Egypt calls for Turkish support, which may carry new dimensions given the rapprochement between Ankara and Riyadh.
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Introduction
Egypt views Red Sea security as a matter that concerns exclusively the states bordering it. This approach reveals Cairo’s anxiety—shared by other regional capitals—over the disorder and volatility that have affected this maritime corridor. These concerns stem not only from the Houthis’ threats to international shipping and to the security of navigation through the Suez Canal, but also from broader geopolitical shifts and alliances that have drawn extra-regional actors into the Red Sea’s strategic landscape and the balances of littoral states. What are the sources of Egypt’s concern, and what policies might it pursue to prevent external interference in Red Sea affairs?
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President Abdel Fattah el‑Sisi: “Exclusive” Responsibility of Littoral States
During a meeting in Cairo on 8 February 2026 with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President el-Sisi made a prominent statement affirming that “the security of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa is a direct and exclusive responsibility of the states bordering them.” Observers viewed this as more than a political remark; it signals a shift in Egypt’s regional strategy and that of other coastal states—particularly in warning against external interventions that could undermine stability.
The timing and setting were chosen to foreground Egypt’s and the region’s concerns and to propose “rules of the game” that confine Red Sea affairs to regional states. The statement implies:
1. Withdrawing legitimacy from any extra-regional interventions.
2. Raising questions about whether responsibility for securing a highly important international waterway can be confined to local states alone.
3. Anchoring the position in recent developments such as Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, and great-power geopolitical competition.
El-Sisi’s message also draws on regional and international contexts and on efforts by Egypt and other littoral states to prevent external interference. These efforts are evident in a series of positions, visits, statements, and measures over recent years, suggesting a converging environment that could elevate Egypt’s strategy to the level of multi-state alignments.
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Implications of Cairo’s Position
Experts argue that el-Sisi’s stance carries deep implications given the multiple tensions affecting the Red Sea. Key dimensions include:
1. Approaches to conflicts in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
2. Water disputes, particularly those related to Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam.
3. Rejection of attempts to divide states or impose new realities that threaten sovereignty—such as recognition of Somaliland, which Egypt views as a violation of the UN Charter.
4. Addressing the growing security vacuum that enables non-littoral actors to intervene in pursuit of access to regional ports, thereby threatening stability.
Regional concerns are grounded in neglected or mishandled realities that now demand more effective policies:
• Yemen: Houthi attacks disrupted shipping, harming the economies of coastal states like Egypt, which reportedly lost around USD 800 million per month in Suez Canal revenues in 2025. Cairo’s view reflects an assessment of indirect Iranian responsibility and the need for a collective littoral response without inviting external powers.
• Sudan: Egypt openly supports the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces, amid reports of direct military assistance. Cairo’s approach aims to prevent state collapse and its spillovers, including refugee flows and cross-border terrorism.
• Horn of Africa: el-Sisi’s remarks implicitly call on regional states to unite against “recognition of faits accomplis,” such as Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland to secure maritime access.
This stance aligns with Egypt’s longstanding strategic constants opposing attempts to redraw the geopolitical map. It emphasizes the exclusive centrality of Red Sea states, grounded in sovereignty and cooperative security. El-Sisi reiterated this view during a Cairo meeting on 23 March 2025 with Eritrea’s foreign minister, stressing the “exclusive role of coastal states in protecting the Red Sea.”
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Rejecting External Interventions
While Cairo’s position may be read as a rebuke to Iranian, Ethiopian, or Israeli actions, observers note that it also rejects Western approaches relying on military coalitions—such as the U.S.–U.K. “Prosperity Guardian” operation that struck Houthi targets in 2024–2025. This rejection is reinforced by regional states’ refusal to join the coalition or provide facilities.
Egypt views external intervention as escalatory and detached from realistic solutions. Analysts argue that resisting foreign presence also means opposing international domination of a corridor carrying roughly 12% of global trade. Criticism extends to China’s military base in Djibouti and warnings against turning the region into a theater of great-power competition.
In a broader context, el-Sisi’s statement connects to UN Security Council Resolution 2812 (14 January 2026), which extended for six months the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting on Houthi attacks, while emphasizing respect for coastal states’ sovereignty and avoiding new external mechanisms.
Beyond this, Cairo’s position goes further by:
1. Declaring the “exclusive” responsibility of Red Sea states.
2. Warning against unilateral recognitions—such as Israel’s—that could encourage state fragmentation.
3. Expressing concern over the Gaza war’s spillover, given the Houthis’ linkage of their attacks to the conflict, drawing the Red Sea into Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.”
Despite divergences between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over Yemen, Cairo seeks a balancing point with both capitals.
Egypt’s view aligns with Turkey’s, as reflected in the joint statement concluding President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo on 4 February 2026. The two leaders agreed on:
• Ensuring regional security to preserve regional and international stability.
• Restoring normal levels of international maritime navigation, referencing earlier threats such as Houthi attacks affecting Bab al-Mandab and the Suez Canal.
• Condemning attempts to establish military presence on Red Sea shores in violation of international law—implicitly rejecting efforts by non-littoral states or external powers to impose a military fait accompli, including Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.
Notably, Egypt has drawn on Turkish support despite Ankara’s own interests in the region—support that may take on new significance amid improving Turkish-Saudi relations.
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Tension with the Israeli Vision
Egypt’s position clearly contradicts Israel’s approach, which addresses the region while excluding non-regional actors—effectively placing Israel outside the legitimate Red Sea security framework.
Israel, by contrast, considers the Red Sea integral to its national security, especially after Houthi attacks affected the port of Eilat. In January 2026, Israel recognized Somaliland’s independence, strengthening its regional footprint through a suspected alignment involving the UAE, Ethiopia, and India to secure Gulf and Bab al-Mandab routes. Egypt views this recognition as a dangerous precedent threatening stability and rejects it as external interference.
Israel’s strategy was outlined in a December 2025 report by the Institute for National Security Studies, recommending an “updated maritime strategy” that includes:
1. Strengthening naval defenses in regional waters, including the Red Sea.
2. Cooperation with the United States and participation in European operations such as “Aspides.”
3. Naval exercises, including with the UAE and Bahrain in 2023.
4. Missions to monitor Iranian movements in the Red Sea.
Egypt counters that such activities constitute illegitimate attempts at dominance, given that Israel is not a principal Red Sea littoral state. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled readiness to join international efforts to keep sea lanes open, this clashes directly with Egypt’s doctrine of regional “exclusivity.”
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Conclusions and Key Takeaways
• Egypt reaffirms the exclusive competence of Red Sea littoral states over security and geopolitical arrangements.
• Cairo rejects Israel’s attempt to impose a new reality through recognition of Somaliland as a means to access the Red Sea.
• Egypt opposes Ethiopia’s bid to secure maritime access via agreements with Somaliland.
• Cairo seeks a comprehensive approach to resolving conflicts in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and the wider Horn of Africa to stabilize the Red Sea.
• Egypt bolsters its stance through alliance-building in the Horn of Africa and among coastal states, rejecting external interventions.
• Egypt declined to join the U.S.–U.K. “Prosperity Guardian” coalition and opposes foreign interventions, including Chinese, Russian, and Iranian involvement.
• Egyptian policies include a military dimension evident in Somalia and Sudan, with potential for further expansion.
• Despite Saudi–Emirati differences over Yemen, Cairo aims for balance with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
• The latest UN resolution on reporting Houthi attacks supports Egypt’s emphasis on respecting coastal states’ sovereignty without new external mechanisms.
• Egypt’s solicitation of Turkish backing is notable given Ankara’s regional interests.
• Turkish support for Egypt’s Red Sea vision may gain added significance amid closer Ankara–Riyadh relations.
