The Opportunity of Phase Two in Ending the War in Gaza
Ameer Makhoul – Progress Center for Policies
Situation Assessment
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Introduction
The announcement of the recovery of the remains of Israeli soldier Ran Gvili from the Gaza Strip constitutes a political and security moment whose significance extends beyond its symbolic and humanitarian dimension to directly affect the trajectory of ending the war and the arrangements of its second phase. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was quick to describe the event as a “great day” and as the fulfillment of a promise, a framing echoed by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and Defense Minister Israel Katz, who portrayed the recovery as a direct execution of a political–military commitment.
However, the timing of the announcement—preceded by Israeli media leaks indicating that a search operation at the same burial site had been postponed about a month earlier by decision of the political leadership—opens the door to a broader reading of the event. This reading links it directly to the cabinet’s decision to open the Rafah crossing and to the transition to the second phase of the plan to end the war, which had been discussed by envoys of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration with Israeli officials. Accordingly, the closure of the prisoners and detainees file cannot be separated from the broader political arrangements currently being reshaped for the post-war phase.
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Analysis
First: Political Synchronization and Timing Management
Information circulating in the Israeli media suggests that the decision to search for Ran Gvili’s remains was militarily feasible weeks earlier, but that its delay resulted from a political decision. This reinforces the assessment that the timing of the recovery was not incidental, but rather incorporated into a broader package of understandings that included opening the Rafah crossing and moving to the second phase of the plan to end the war.
This interpretation is supported by earlier U.S. statements indicating possession of confirmed information regarding the burial location, and that Hamas and Islamic Jihad had provided this information through mediators. This points to the existence of indirect, multi-party communication channels involving Egypt, Qatar, and the United States, culminating in the cabinet’s decision at midnight on the twenty-fifth of the month to open the Rafah crossing—less than a day after the recovery of the remains.
Second: Netanyahu’s Political Gain and Coalition Constraints
At the level of Israeli public opinion, Netanyahu secures a significant political gain by closing one of the most painful files associated with the failure of October 7, 2023—the issue of prisoners and detainees, both living and deceased. This development neutralizes one of the strongest drivers behind demands for an official or governmental commission of inquiry into the failure, or at least delays its popular momentum.
Conversely, the opposition does not appear capable of transforming the issue of delaying the search for Gvili into a pressure-driven public cause, allowing the file to be closed politically. This achievement is likely to reflect positively on Netanyahu’s electoral standing, without necessarily strengthening his partners within the governing coalition. On the contrary, it may deepen internal divergences, particularly in light of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s threat to dissolve the Knesset over disputes related to the budget and the ultra-Orthodox conscription law.
In this context, dissolving the Knesset appears to be a reserve option in Netanyahu’s hands—one he may brandish or activate only if he concludes that early elections serve his personal interests at a moment when the prisoners’ file has been closed, rather than in response to pressure from his right-wing partners.
Third: Phase Two and Filling the Governance Vacuum in Gaza
The decision to open the Rafah crossing from the Palestinian side, coupled with Egypt’s rejection of Israeli conditions related to presence or direct oversight, comes as part of the practical entry into the second phase of the ceasefire plan. This reading is reinforced by the visit of Nikolay Mladenov in his capacity as a representative of the Peace Board and its executive body, alongside the movements of U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
Taken together, these indicators point to the Trump administration’s determination to implement the second phase and to commence the work of the international executive body and the Palestinian technocratic government—referred to as the “National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.” Filling the governance vacuum in the Strip is expected to constrain the Israeli military’s ability to continue violations and to lay the groundwork for rebuilding essential health and humanitarian infrastructure, as a prelude to launching reconstruction.
In this context, Netanyahu is likely to attempt to justify any potential breach of the ceasefire by invoking the issue of “disarmament” in Gaza. However, this argument lacks credibility given the Israeli army’s failure over two years of war to achieve this objective, and given that such a task—if raised—would shift to a political and institutional track rather than direct military action.
Fourth: Israeli Public Mood and the Limits of Returning to War
With the closure of the prisoners and detainees file, the Israeli government’s justifications for returning to war or obstructing its termination phases diminish—particularly at the level of public opinion, which has been exhausted by a prolonged, multi-front conflict. This trend is reinforced by a recent poll conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies, showing that more than half of Israelis feel an improvement in their sense of security, making a return to war a publicly undesirable option and politically unproductive for Netanyahu.
Accordingly, Smotrich’s threats to dissolve the Knesset are unlikely to gain broad acceptance within the right-wing electorate, which prefers the continuation of the government until the end of its term—a rare scenario in Israeli political experience. Early elections remain a possibility only if Netanyahu assesses that they serve his direct political interests.
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Conclusions
• The recovery of the remains of Ran Gvili is likely to constitute a pivotal Israeli moment used to justify the transition to the second phase of the plan to end the war, while reducing the government’s ability to market a return to war or obstruct its course.
• Netanyahu succeeds in politically leveraging the event by reinforcing his image as having fulfilled the promise to recover all prisoners and detainees, thereby improving his electoral prospects, without enhancing coalition cohesion—and potentially paving the way toward a national unity government that excludes the most extreme current.
• The recovery of the remains reinforces the Zionist consensus around the centrality of retrieving every soldier or detainee, reviving the narrative of unity between society and the military as a cornerstone of Zionist doctrine.
• From a Palestinian and Arab perspective, the event represents a political opportunity to press toward filling the governance vacuum in the Gaza Strip, preventing ceasefire violations, ensuring full transition to the second phase, and enabling the launch of reconstruction and the activation of the technocratic government under a supportive political, regional, and international umbrella.
