Reshaping the Balance of International Influence on the Continent
Policy Paper by Zaelnoon Suliman
African Affairs Unit – Progress Center for Policies
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Introduction
China has announced the removal of tariffs on imports from 53 African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations, effective 1 May. This move expands a previous exemption framework that covered 33 countries. Eswatini was excluded in line with Beijing’s “One China” policy, given its diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
The decision goes beyond its immediate commercial dimension. It constitutes a geo-economic shift with far-reaching implications for the balance of international influence in Africa and for the continent’s relationship with Western powers—particularly the United States and the European Union. It also opens new strategic pathways for regional actors, especially Gulf states.
The step comes amid a transitional international environment marked by intensifying U.S.–China competition, disruptions in global supply chains, and the repositioning of vital maritime corridors—granting the decision strategic weight beyond traditional trade logic.
This paper examines the dimensions and implications of China’s tariff exemptions for African states and for the regional environment in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf.
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I. Economic Context – Consolidating China’s Position as Africa’s Primary Partner
China–Africa trade reached approximately $295–296 billion in 2024. Chinese exports to Africa totaled around $179 billion, while imports from Africa stood at roughly $117 billion.
In 2025, bilateral trade rose to nearly $348 billion—an estimated 17.7% increase—reinforcing China’s position as Africa’s largest trading partner.
However, the trade balance remains clearly in Beijing’s favor, reflecting a persistent pattern: African raw material exports in exchange for Chinese industrial imports. The new tariff decision aims to deepen interdependence and expand Africa’s access to the Chinese market, strengthening structural economic linkages between the two sides.
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II. Geo-Economic Dimensions of the Decision
1. Weakening Western Leverage
The United States relies on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) as a conditional preferential trade instrument, granting African states facilitated access to U.S. markets in exchange for governance and human rights benchmarks.
China, by contrast, does not attach political conditionalities to its tariff exemptions. This divergence weakens Washington’s ability to use trade preferences or selective sanctions as leverage, as the expansion of an alternative market reduces the effectiveness of such tools.
Similarly, the European Union—whose Africa policy often blends economic engagement with security and political considerations—may find itself compelled to reformulate its strategy beyond traditional partnership mechanisms.
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2. Reconfiguring Global Supply Chains
The decision reinforces Africa’s position as a key supplier of strategic minerals, agricultural goods, and natural resources critical to China’s industrial base and energy transition.
The zero-tariff framework is likely to:
• Expand Chinese investment in mining sectors.
• Strengthen export-oriented infrastructure.
• Institutionalize a direct linkage between African production and Chinese industrial consumption.
This dynamic deepens Africa’s integration into value chains centered on China rather than traditional Western markets.
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3. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: A Parallel Strategic Dimension
China’s “zero-tariff” policy toward 53 African states cannot be interpreted as purely commercial. Expanding African exports—particularly raw materials and agricultural products—to China implies intensified trade flows reliant on extended maritime supply chains passing through critical chokepoints.
The maritime corridor connecting East African ports to Asian markets depends on port networks, logistical services, maritime fueling hubs, and transit routes centered around the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden–Indian Ocean axis, particularly the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Thus, the decision becomes part of a broader “supply chain architecture,” not merely a reduction in import costs. Its success hinges on port capacity, maritime security, shipping continuity, and insurance stability—elements of maritime-logistical power as much as trade incentives.
This interconnection explains the policy’s overlap with great-power competition in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. China has developed a hybrid presence combining commercial, logistical, and security dimensions—most visibly in Djibouti, near one of the world’s most strategic maritime passages, where port operations coexist with logistical-security support functions.
For Washington, China’s expansion into African ports—potentially adaptable for future logistical or military purposes—is a key front in great-power competition. The Red Sea is therefore not merely a trade route, but a theater for measuring infrastructural influence, positioning, and control over supply chains.
The United States has responded not only rhetorically but also by attempting to construct alternative critical mineral supply chains and cross-border infrastructure corridors designed to reduce reliance on Chinese-led networks. As the Red Sea’s strategic value intensifies—linking Asia, Europe, and Africa—any expansion in China–Africa trade becomes a multiplier of East Africa’s geopolitical weight in maritime security calculations and port competition.
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III. Implications for Gulf States
China’s decision places Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE—at a strategic inflection point.
On one hand, expanded African access to the Chinese market opens opportunities for Gulf investment in export-oriented agriculture, agri-food value chains, and mining—aligned with long-term supply agreements serving Asian demand. This supports Gulf strategies for food security and diversified external investments.
On the other hand, the decision amplifies the logistical-maritime dimension in East Africa and the Red Sea, where Chinese influence in port management and supply chain governance is increasing. This creates a more complex competitive environment for Gulf-led port and logistics ventures.
Gulf states’ ability to capitalize on this transformation will depend on transitioning from fragmented investments to integrated systems—production, financing, transportation, storage, and marketing—ensuring meaningful participation in China-bound value chains rather than occupying a marginal role in a progressively China-centered trade ecosystem.
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Conclusions
• China’s zero-tariff decision represents a geo-economic shift reshaping the balance of international influence in Africa.
• It weakens Western trade leverage mechanisms based on political conditionality.
• It strengthens Africa’s integration into China-centered supply chains, particularly in mining and agriculture.
• It expands China’s maritime-strategic footprint in the Red Sea and East Africa.
• It provides African states with greater strategic maneuvering space—provided they adopt effective national industrial policies.
• It compels Gulf states to reposition investment strategies rapidly to avoid marginalization within an increasingly competitive and China-oriented environment.
