Beijing May Receive the Nuclear Deposit: Reading the Contours of the US-Iran Agreement

Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas — Progress Center for Policies

Introduction
In a significant development, recent hours have brought the first signs of a possible memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran that would extend the ceasefire by sixty days, during which detailed negotiations would take place on the principles and headings set out in the memorandum. This development comes as the product of intensive Pakistani mediation, supported by Chinese and Qatari efforts, two weeks after the American president’s visit to China. What are the contours of the agreement, and what can be inferred from its form and content?

I. The Facts

On 28 and 29 May 2026, Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammed Ishaq Dar visited Washington and met with his American counterpart Marco Rubio, who described Pakistan as an “essential partner” in Iran diplomacy. The meeting centred on Pakistan’s role in converting the ceasefire into lasting peace, including questions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and enriched uranium.

On 28 May, Trump announced that the agreement had been “largely negotiated,” but cautioned against haste, saying “Iran wants a deal but we’re not satisfied yet.” The day before, Iranian sources had confirmed that no final nuclear discussions were taking place in the first phase, while Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei warned that “the Gulf will no longer be a shield for American bases.”

Leaked information indicates that the agreement’s provisions include: a sixty-day extension of the ceasefire; the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz through the removal of Iranian mines and without the imposition of fees; the lifting of the American naval blockade on Iranian ports; sixty days of nuclear discussions encompassing the transfer or dilution of the highly enriched uranium stockpile under international supervision; partial sanctions relief in exchange for temporary nuclear guarantees; with questions concerning the missile programme, proxy support, and reparations deferred to later stages.

The American positions centre on insisting on a deal superior to the 2015 Vienna agreement, demanding the complete disposal of the highly enriched uranium stockpile, and rejecting any long-term enrichment on Iranian soil. Pakistani sources indicate that Iran has agreed to zero enrichment of uranium under the heading of a “suspension” or “freeze” for a period Iran has described as five years, while Washington is demanding twenty years.

Regarding the stockpile of 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, Iran’s Supreme Leader sent a signal — understood by mediators to mean — that Iran would agree to transferring the quantity to a country other than the United States, having rejected its transfer to Washington. Following Iran’s refusal to transfer it to Pakistan and Washington’s refusal to transfer it to Russia, the Pakistani mediator — following a visit by Pakistan’s prime minister and army chief to Beijing — secured China’s agreement to receive the stockpile on its territory as a “deposit,” in the Iranian formulation. In exchange for Beijing’s rejection of American oversight, the Pakistani mediator proposed that the International Atomic Energy Agency assume this supervisory role. However, a senior Iranian source told Reuters on 29 May that Tehran had not yet agreed to the transfer of the stockpile. While Iran rejected the dismantling of its reactors as demanded by Washington, the Pakistani mediator proposed gathering the electronic components of advanced centrifuges in a designated location, under IAEA seal and supervision.

On the financial front, Iran is demanding the release of 24 billion dollars, half to be paid at the outset of the agreement’s implementation and the other half after thirty days, with a guaranteed mechanism for accessing the funds given the impossibility of banking transfers under existing sanctions. Washington is demanding oversight of these funds, while the Pakistani mediator has proposed a mechanism placing them in conditional accounts to be disbursed according to a monitored procurement list to verify their humanitarian and developmental purposes.

II. Analysis
The Memorandum as a Framework Agreement, Not a Final Deal
The memorandum is, at its core, a framework agreement for forthcoming negotiations rather than a comprehensive settlement resolving outstanding issues. It guarantees the opening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for lifting the blockade on Iranian ports, but addresses the nuclear programme alone without touching on ballistic missiles or Iran’s relationship with its proxy networks. Crucially, the anticipated agreement encompasses the nuclear file — whereas Iran had previously demanded its restriction to opening the strait and lifting the blockade, with nuclear negotiations deferred — revealing a substantive Iranian concession on the structure of the negotiating equation itself.

Zero Enrichment in Ambiguous Terms
The agreement affirms zero enrichment under deliberately ambiguous headings — “suspension” or “freeze” — for an extended period, and the transfer of the highly enriched stockpile to a third country, most likely China. This formulation allows each party to present the agreement in terms suited to its domestic narrative: Tehran can speak of a “suspension” that preserves face, while Washington can speak of “zeroing” that satisfies hawks.

China Reclaims a Central Role
The memorandum grants China a central role in receiving the uranium stockpile — a role that Russia played following the 2015 Vienna agreement. This shift reveals a redistribution of international roles in the file, in which China appears to have become the player trusted most by both sides. Notably, Washington’s acceptance of a transfer to China hands Beijing a card it could deploy should tensions between them escalate — raising serious questions about the American strategic calculations behind this acceptance.

Unprecedented Financial Controls
The agreement conditions the released funds on oversight by a body monitoring expenditure for developmental and humanitarian purposes — an unprecedented arrangement compared to the 2015 experience. This stringency reflects lessons learned and a fundamental American distrust of the trajectory of Iranian spending.

Timing and Domestic Calculations
The memorandum spans sixty days, covering the World Cup and the United States’ 250th anniversary celebrations — a timeline that serves Trump in projecting the image of a “peacemaker.” The reservations expressed by both the American president and the Iranian Supreme Leader, and the foot-dragging in endorsing the agreement, stem from purely domestic imperatives — the need to appear as the victor in the recent war — rather than from substantive disagreements over content.

Lebanon Decoupled from the Iran File
The leaked provisions reveal that the memorandum contains no linkage between the Iranian ceasefire and the Lebanese ceasefire, confirming Israeli conditions for the separation of the two files — leaving Lebanon outside the umbrella of the agreement and allowing Israel to continue its operations there unimpeded.

III. Conclusions

The memorandum of understanding is a framework agreement for forthcoming negotiations, guaranteeing the opening of the Strait of Hormuz without Iranian oversight or fees, in exchange for lifting the blockade on Iranian ports.
The agreement addresses the nuclear programme alone, without touching on ballistic missiles or regional proxy networks — representing an Iranian concession from its original position of deferring the nuclear file.

The agreement affirms zero enrichment under ambiguous formulations — “suspension” or “freeze” — for an extended period, with the highly enriched stockpile to be transferred to a third country, most likely China.

Released funds are conditioned on oversight for developmental and humanitarian purposes — an unprecedented arrangement reflecting the lessons of 2015.

The memorandum spans sixty days, covering the World Cup and the United States’ 250th anniversary celebrations, with the possibility of extension beyond the November 2026 elections.

The memorandum grants China a central role in receiving the stockpile in place of Russia; Washington’s acceptance of this arrangement hands Beijing a card it may deploy at a later stage.

The memorandum contains no linkage between the Iranian and Lebanese ceasefires, confirming Israeli conditions for the separation of the two files.

The reservations of both the American president and the Iranian Supreme Leader stem from domestic imperatives around projecting the image of victory, not from substantive disagreements.

China played a role in drawing Iran toward the deal — a development that reveals a redistribution of international roles in the Iranian file.