As-Suwayda and Pathways to National Stability: The Third Way in Light of the Amman Agreement
Short Policy Paper by Mustafa Al-Miqdad, Progress Center for Policies – Damascus
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Introduction
As-Suwayda Governorate is passing through a delicate phase in which deep-seated local structural crises intersect with broader national and regional shifts that are reshaping the Syrian question as a whole. While the political settlement track consolidates around the principle of Syria’s territorial unity under the trilateral Amman understandings, and the path toward restoring state sovereignty in the northeast advances following the understanding with the SDF, As-Suwayda faces a dual question: how can it avoid sliding into local isolation or indirect internationalization, and how can it reintegrate into the broader national trajectory without internal confrontation or a political vacuum?
In this context, the “Third Way” initiative emerges as a civil attempt to return politics to society and to break the prevailing binary that dominates the local scene—between the grip of de facto authority on the one hand, and the risks of chaos or external dependency on the other. This assessment situates the initiative within As-Suwayda’s social and political structure, unpacks the risks stemming from ambiguity in relations with Israel, and places the governorate within national transformations that signal the declining viability of “gray zones.”
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Analysis
First: The Internal Reality—Between De Facto Authority and the Silence of the Majority
The internal scene in As-Suwayda is marked by a clear imbalance in the social–political equilibrium. The role of the religious authority, represented by the wing of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, has shifted from a symbolic–social position to a de facto authority that directly influences the public sphere and constrains the formation of normal political debate. The discourse of “unity of ranks” is employed as a tool of social control that suppresses legitimate disagreement and converts collective anxiety into generalized silence.
This produces an unequal division: an active and influential minority monopolizing the public space, versus a silent or “gray” majority that, at its core, inclines toward the state as a national reference but lacks safe channels of expression.
In parallel, an oppositional current has emerged that declares support for the state yet carries exclusionary ideological backgrounds of a jihadist nature, rendering it incompatible with the cultural and intellectual fabric of Druze society and limiting its ability to become a genuine social alternative—despite its success in marketing its narrative to certain external decision-making circles.
Meanwhile, academic and cultural elites have retreated to the margins, oscillating between cautious silence and compelled conformity with the dominant discourse, depriving society of a key instrument for balance and political meaning-making.
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Second: The Social–Sectarian Dimension and the Constraints on Public Debate
Historically, Druze social structure tends toward cohesion in the face of external threats, with “unity of ranks” perceived as a protective mechanism. Under current conditions, this tendency has been transformed into a brake on internal debate, whereby legitimate differences are annulled in the name of preserving unity.
This phenomenon is compounded by the notable alignment of progressive and secular political components, as well as rational national forces, behind the spiritual leadership represented by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri’s wing. This alignment has effectively neutralized their active, rational role in society in favor of forces of polarization, withdrawal, and external attachment with deferred solutions. The result is a society governed by narrow narratives that obstruct structural remedies to deep-rooted crises and convert local anxiety into cumulative retreat and silence—further weakening the public sphere and society’s capacity for national initiative.
Addressing this imbalance requires restoring the role of rational and progressive frameworks within society and enabling them to act as social mediators that preserve equilibrium between spiritual authority and national interest—opening genuine space for internal debate without threatening traditional notions of unity.
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Third: Ambiguity in Relations with Israel as a Strategic Risk
As-Suwayda lacks any organized, publicly articulated political position toward Israel. Instead, contradictory narratives circulate informally, ranging from depicting Israel as a perpetual threat to imagining it as a hypothetical security guarantor. This ambiguity offers the governorate no leverage; rather, it opens the door to serious strategic risks:
• Turning As-Suwayda into a regional pressure card;
• Inviting external interventions under the pretext of “protection”;
• Cementing the image of the governorate as outside the national consensus, thereby facilitating its isolation or internationalization.
Regional experience confirms that Israel deals with local communities as temporary instruments within its security calculations, not as sustainable partners. Accordingly, As-Suwayda possesses no intrinsic capacity for a special or secure relationship with Israel.
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Fourth: As-Suwayda in the Context of National Transformations (The Amman Agreement and the SDF Track)
The trilateral Amman Agreement clearly signals the consolidation of the political settlement’s foundations: Syria’s territorial unity, rejection of secessionist entities, and the affirmation of the state as the sole sovereign authority. Similarly, the understanding with the SDF and the restoration of state sovereignty in the northeast reflect a strategic orientation toward closing the file of parallel administrations.
Within this context, the model of “permanent exceptionalism” is practically receding, and the notion of gray zones is losing its viability. As-Suwayda is not an exception to this trajectory; rather, it is part of it by virtue of geography, politics, and history.
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Fifth: The Position of the “Third Way”—Who Are They and What Are Their Sources of Influence?
In As-Suwayda’s current landscape, the “Third Way” (or Third Current initiative) is not an organized party framework or a traditional political force with widely recognized leadership inside or outside the governorate. Rather, it is a recent community initiative launched by academics, intellectuals, and civil actors from As-Suwayda to present a civil alternative to prevailing military and factional solutions.
The initiative publicly emerged under this name in early February 2026 and comprises individuals with a civil–social orientation. It issued a political document describing itself as a “practical roadmap” to address humanitarian and social crises in the governorate and to open a path for national dialogue.
• Its founders emphasize that they do not represent an authority or a governing project, but seek to create a “civil rescue body emerging from society and working for it.”
• Declared objectives include condemning massacres, holding the authorities responsible for events, strengthening As-Suwayda’s unity within a unified Syria, facilitating the return of residents and compensation for the affected, and insulating the governorate from regional conflicts.
• It lacks a unified political leadership with broad media presence; sources do not cite prominent leaders, aside from informal references to figures such as Kinan Masoud as one of the initiative’s participants in a press interview. Overall, the initiative remains collective and semi-open.
• Prospects for expansion and grassroots organization remain limited in the near term; it is unlikely to evolve into a full political movement or organized party. Its role is more that of a civil coordination space aimed at breaking the stalemate between society, the state, and local forces.
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Conclusion
The available evidence confirms that As-Suwayda is not an isolated local crisis but a political–social nexus situated at the intersection of national transformations. Ambiguity in relations with Israel constitutes an existential risk rather than a bargaining asset. The general direction of the state and the international community converges clearly on Syrian unity and the rejection of gray entities.
Within this framework, the “Third Way” does not represent an alternative to the state, but rather a societal tool to prevent local collapse until politics regains its natural presence in the public sphere.
