Amid Open Contradictions: What Are the Prospects of the Washington–Tehran Talks in Muscat?

Situation Assessment – Progress Center for Policies

Introduction:

Amid controversy over the venue of the talks and military frictions in Gulf waters, the next round of negotiations between the United States and Iran is set to convene in Muscat, despite the absence of any clear convergence on the negotiation agenda or its files. While some reports speak of sudden Iranian shifts that could lead to tangible progress, other assessments expect the talks to be sterile—possibly serving as a pretext for military strikes that could even target Iran’s Supreme Leader.

Key Developments:
• On 4 February 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump stated that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, “should be very worried,” a remark widely interpreted as a threat from the highest authority in Washington that he could be a target in any future war.
• Amid debate over the venue of a meeting between Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the latter announced that the session would take place on 6 February 2026 in Muscat.
• Axios reported that nine regional states sent messages to the U.S. administration urging it not to cancel the Muscat talks, in an effort to preserve the diplomatic track.
• Iranian monitoring sources confirm that Tehran’s decision to engage in talks reflects an internal shift influenced by consultations with regional capitals as well as Moscow and Beijing. European sources, in particular, point to Chinese advice urging Iran to reach an agreement with the Trump administration at this stage and to avoid the option of war.

• Iranian sources stress that the decision to negotiate is that of the Supreme Leader himself, even though he will face pressure from multiple hardline currents around him.
• These sources deny U.S. claims that Iran requested moving the talks to Muscat, clarifying that no alternative venue was ever agreed upon and that Iran considers Muscat the long-established location for U.S.–Iran negotiations.
• They recall that the 2015 agreement with the administration of former U.S. President Barack Obama was brokered in Oman’s capital, underscoring the Sultanate’s traditional, historical, and trusted mediating role for both sides.
• Some analyses suggest that Iran views Turkey as a party to the international conflict with Iran due to regional competition and conflicting interests, and that recent Turkish mediation does not make Ankara as neutral a broker as Oman.
• Official Iranian sources indicate that direct talks—i.e., both sides sitting in the same room—are not currently on the agenda. This implies that negotiations will remain indirect, likely through intermediaries, to avoid direct escalation.
• U.S. sources, by contrast, indicate the Trump administration’s preference for direct talks, viewing them as a potential achievement that could justify continued negotiations.
• The persistence of indirect talks, as in previous rounds, is seen as signaling stagnation and potential failure, which could tip the balance toward a military option advocated by some U.S. actors and Israel.
• Observers highlight the possible participation of Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and adviser, noting his potential influence on the president and Iran’s interest in broadening American perspectives on the negotiations.

• Research bodies focused on Iranian affairs previously revealed that Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, expressed concern that during five rounds of talks with Araghchi in 2025, Witkoff repeatedly had to return to Washington to receive further instructions.
• This prompted some Iranian officials to consider openness to expanding the U.S. delegation to include figures with more direct access to Trump, ensuring speed and continuity—hinting at receptiveness to someone like Kushner.
• There is no confirmation of pressure to include officials from Egypt, Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey in the talks. Iranian sources indicate that the only non-Omani figure likely to attend is the Qatari prime minister, highlighting Qatar’s potential mediating role.
• Observers were struck by security tensions coinciding with preparations for the talks, including reports that U.S. forces downed an Iranian drone near the USS Abraham Lincoln off Iran’s southeastern coast, and accusations that Iranian forces attempted to intercept a U.S. oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Analysts also noted intersecting statements by Trump and Larijani: Trump said Iran was “speaking seriously” about its nuclear program, while Larijani confirmed progress toward establishing a framework for negotiations—reflecting cautious optimism on both sides and a focus on finding common ground.
• Some European information suggests consideration of formulas such as a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment in exchange for international recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear activities, potentially linked to the idea of a regional nuclear consortium under strict international supervision—a concept Iran has previously viewed favorably.

• Experts broadly agree that the principal obstacle remains Washington’s demand to limit the number and range of Iran’s missiles. Iran continues to insist on confining talks strictly to the nuclear file, especially after the twelve-day war with Israel in June 2025, during which missiles proved a key deterrent and defensive tool capable of reaching Israel.
• On 4 January 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that any “meaningful” talks with Iran must include its missile arsenal, the nuclear issue, and other matters.
• Some information indicates that Turkish mediation with Washington focused on persuading the U.S. to adopt a phased approach—securing progress on the nuclear file first, then moving to other issues later—an approach reportedly inspired by Iranian positions conveyed to Washington.

Conclusion:
• There are no reliable indicators that would allow for confident expectations of successful negotiations or the exclusion of a military option.
• The positions of both sides remain far apart—at least publicly—regarding the scope of the negotiations.
• While Washington (via Rubio) insists that talks must include Iran’s missile program and regional proxy relations, Tehran maintains that negotiations are limited strictly to the nuclear file.
• Iran denies rejecting Ankara as a venue, reiterating that the issue was never raised and that Muscat has always been the established site for U.S.–Iran talks.
• Iranian actors express frustration with Witkoff’s repeated returns to Washington in previous rounds and signal openness to expanding the U.S. delegation, including the possible presence of Jared Kushner.
• The attendance of regional representatives at the Muscat session is unconfirmed, with Iran indicating only the possible presence of the Qatari prime minister.
• Some sources, including Iranian ones, suspect that the negotiations are an attempt by Trump to exhaust diplomatic options in order to justify a military course, reinforced by the U.S. naval military buildup in the region.