America Withdraws from Iraq: The Facts and Their Implications for Washington’s Plans in the Region
Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas, Progress Center for Policies – London
Introduction
The withdrawal of US forces from the whole of Iraq imposes new security and political balances of power in the region. It also raises questions about the future of the American presence in the Middle East and the extent to which Washington’s security guarantees can be trusted. It further calls for a reading of the military and political balances of power in light of the current conflict with Iran.
The Facts
On 27 September 2024, under President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Washington and Baghdad issued a joint statement providing for the end of the Coalition’s mission inside Iraq by the end of September 2025 at the latest, and for completing the withdrawal and supporting Syria operations until September 2026.
On 18 January 2026, the Iraqi Higher Military Committee announced the evacuation of the federal bases, including Ain al-Asad and the Joint Operations Command, while retaining limited logistical support in Erbil for Syria operations.
In July 2026, during a visit to Washington, Al-Zaidi and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reaffirmed the commitment to ending the mission by 30 September. Before this, Al-Zaidi had announced that the deadline for disarming armed factions operating outside the framework of the state was postponed to 30 June 2027, after influential Iran-linked factions refused to hand over their weapons and set conditions for doing so.
On 25 September 2026, the United States handed over the Diplomatic Support Center at Baghdad International Airport to the Iraqi authorities under an agreement signed that day. On 28 September 2026, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs in the Kurdistan Regional Government issued a statement expressing concern that the forces were leaving without an alternative air defense system being provided. The ministry recorded that the Region had been subjected to more than a thousand drone and ballistic missile attacks during the US-Iranian conflict, which has been ongoing since late February 2026. It stressed that protecting the airspace is the responsibility of the federal government. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani expressed the same position, warning that the Region would be left exposed.
On 30 September 2026, US and Coalition forces completed their orderly withdrawal from Erbil Air Base, and the Pentagon officially ended the mission of Operation “Inherent Resolve” inside Iraq. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell announced that the withdrawal reflects the success of a 12-year campaign that defeated ISIS as an organized military threat. He said it transfers primary responsibility for the organization’s remnants and for Iran-linked militias to the Iraqi government, while targeted training and intelligence support will continue.
US President Donald Trump described the withdrawal as the end of a “costly journey to hell” and a decision to return home. Reports state that the withdrawal reduces the direct US military presence in Iraq to zero and shifts the weight of the counter-ISIS mission to Jordan, where about 4,000 US troops remain, capable of responding.
Analysis and Implications
Analyses suggest that the move is not an automatic prelude to broad withdrawals from the Middle East, since Washington retains bases in the Gulf and Jordan and continues operations in Syria. It does, however, reflect a priority of reducing long-term ground deployment and a preference for bilateral partnerships over open-ended combat coalitions.
Think tanks such as the Atlantic Council and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies also believe that American influence is shifting from a military front to training, intelligence and economic relations, without disappearing.
Security sources acknowledge that the withdrawal weakens the air defense cover that American systems provided in Erbil, and leaves the Kurdistan Region more exposed to drone and missile attacks. They say that Baghdad bears constitutional responsibility for the airspace, but its current capabilities cannot immediately make up for the American absence.
The sources add that the risk of ISIS cells returning remains in the disputed territories, while the factions retain greater freedom of movement. Iraqi sources point out that the postponement settled the debate between the state and the factions. The factions had justified keeping their weapons by citing the presence of foreign forces. Nevertheless, after the withdrawal, the “Islamic Resistance” factions celebrated the move as a historic victory, and Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades refused to hand over their weapons before “full sovereignty.”
The sources add that Al-Zaidi is pressing for weapons to be restricted to the hands of the state, but he faces a Shiite base that sees the factions as a form of protection. The political balance therefore remains tilted toward postponing the confrontation.
Diplomatic observers believe that the withdrawal reduces Washington’s reliability as an immediate security guarantor in the eyes of the Gulf states, especially as the US-Iranian war continues since February 2026 and Iraqi militias have targeted a Saudi pipeline. Gulf partners read this second withdrawal from Iraq, after that of 2011, as evidence of a declining will for long ground commitments, and they are therefore accelerating the diversification of their defense partnerships.
Research sources believe that the move relatively strengthens Iran’s position inside Iraq, as Tehran and the Axis of Resistance celebrate it as a step toward driving US forces out of the region. The sources note that in Syria, the Coalition loses an Iraqi logistical platform that had supported operations until September 2026. Greater responsibility therefore shifts to Damascus and to the forces operating from Jordan.
Analyses by specialized research centers observe that the withdrawal keeps Iraq an arena of competition between deep-rooted Iranian influence and Baghdad’s pressure to impose a state monopoly on arms. Meanwhile, the Syrian-Iraqi border is affected by ISIS’s ability to exploit any vacuum. The analyses add that, for Israel, the withdrawal weakens the presence of an American military ally on Iran’s eastern border.
Assessments conclude that Israel cannot serve as a security substitute for the United States in the region, because the Gulf states prefer the traditional American cover. However, in an Israeli reading, the withdrawal reinforces the need to deepen intelligence coordination with cooperating capitals in the region.
Conclusion
The withdrawal ends the American combat presence inside Iraq and transfers the counter-ISIS mission to Jordan and Syria, without eliminating the American ability to strike from regional bases. The withdrawal is not an automatic prelude to a comprehensive withdrawal from the Middle East. Rather, it reflects a shift from long-term ground deployment to bilateral partnership, training and intelligence, while bases in the Gulf and Jordan are maintained.
The Kurdistan Region is left without American air defense cover. Constitutional responsibility passes to Baghdad, which lacks the immediate capacity to compensate.
The postponement of factional disarmament in Iraq defers a resolution of the state’s monopoly on arms. The Iran-linked factions are exploiting the withdrawal to declare “victory” and to refuse to hand over their weapons until political conditions that are difficult to meet are fulfilled.
The withdrawal weakens Washington’s image as a permanent security guarantor in the eyes of the Gulf, even as the Pentagon affirms its continued readiness to respond. This is pushing partners to diversify their defense alliances.
Iran makes symbolic gains inside Iraq, and the Axis celebrates the departure as a step toward driving US forces out of the region. The Coalition loses an Iraqi logistical platform that had supported Syria operations up to the deadline. The burden of preventing the organization’s return therefore shifts more heavily to Damascus and to the forces operating from Jordan.
The danger of sleeper cells and of a vacuum in the disputed territories remains. The militias retain greater freedom of movement as long as disarmament is postponed and Iraqi security decision-making remains divided.
The withdrawal does not turn Israel into a credible substitute for the American military presence in the eyes of Arab capitals, which prefer the traditional American cover.
