Al-Zaidi in Washington: A Manoeuvre to Separate Baghdad’s Decision from Tehran’s Guardianship
Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas, Progress Center for Policies – London
Introduction: The American president extended attention and support to Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his reception in Washington. While al-Zaidi preceded the visit with an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign in Iraq, and American media reported his protest to Iranian officials over Tehran’s support for armed Iraqi factions, observers are raising questions about the ability of the Baghdad-Washington alliance to push Iranian influence out of Iraq — especially after Tehran demonstrated, through Khamenei’s funeral in Najaf and Karbala, that its influence in the country persists.
Key Facts:
On July 14, 2026, US President Donald Trump received Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi at the White House, in al-Zaidi’s first official foreign visit since taking office.
Trump described the meeting as showing “wonderful chemistry between two successful businessmen,” and praised al-Zaidi, calling him the “new hero” who achieved a “decisive electoral victory.”
Both sides pledged to deepen economic relations and increase Iraqi oil production, with talk of numerous deals in energy, technology, and infrastructure.
Al-Zaidi announced before Trump a date for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq: September 30, 2027.
The meeting focused on shifting from military to economic cooperation, and on reducing Iranian influence.
Hours before al-Zaidi’s arrival in Washington, American media published reports that al-Zaidi had protested to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Quds Force commander Ismail Qaani over Tehran’s continued support for armed Iraqi factions.
Days before the visit, starting June 28, 2026, al-Zaidi’s government carried out an anti-corruption campaign unprecedented since 2003, toppling mid-level figures within the state — a move seen as a message to the United States and as meeting the demands of its presidential envoy, Tom Barrack.
On July 8, 2026, al-Zaidi’s government declared an official holiday, as Najaf and Karbala became the scene of funeral processions for Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Leaders from the Coordination Framework (Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri, Qais al-Khazali) took part in the event, along with prominent commanders from the Popular Mobilization Forces, in addition to Muqtada al-Sadr and Sunni figures such as Mohammed al-Halbousi and Khaled al-Mulla.
Participants in Najaf were estimated at more than 2.3 million people. Al-Zaidi received the Iranian delegation at Najaf airport on the evening of July 7, an event observers viewed as Iranian pressure on al-Zaidi just days before his Washington visit.
On May 14, 2026, al-Zaidi assumed the premiership in an unexpected manner. A businessman with no prior political background, he emerged as a consensus candidate after months of political deadlock following the parliamentary elections held on November 11, 2025.
Trump had publicly rejected the Shiite Coordination Framework’s candidate, Nouri al-Maliki, then expressed full support for al-Zaidi after his appointment to the post.
Analysts consider that Washington’s choice to reject al-Maliki and back al-Zaidi came within the framework of a US policy overseen by presidential envoy Tom Barrack, and that al-Zaidi’s anti-corruption drive and his demand that weapons be confined to the state came in response to the demands of this policy.
Al-Zaidi’s visit comes at an extremely sensitive moment, as the US-Iran conflict escalates regionally from the Strait of Hormuz to Lebanon — meaning Washington is counting on the Iraqi prime minister and his government to open a new chapter in curbing Iran’s influence in Iraq.
Iraqi sources monitoring the situation note that al-Zaidi is trying to play a balancing role: on one hand launching a bold anti-corruption campaign and voicing protest over Iranian support for the factions, which pleases Washington and opens the door to American investment; on the other hand, he was compelled to allow Khamenei’s massive official funeral, which demonstrated Iran’s continued ability to mobilize the Shiite street and official institutions.
Research sources observe that despite the broad public US support for al-Zaidi and his government, he faces major challenges, chief among them:
-The existence of major armed factions — some embedded within the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Coordination Framework — that possess weapons and political and popular influence, all of them loyal to Iran and within its sphere of influence in the country. This means any serious attempt to confine weapons to the state could lead to direct confrontation. Khamenei’s funeral proved that these factions remain capable of mobilizing millions.
-The difficulty of fighting corruption, given that it is a phenomenon deeply rooted in — and a beneficiary of — Iraq’s political system. While the recent steps were exceptional and unprecedented, they could lose momentum if they remain confined to mid- and low-level figures, especially since they may face fierce resistance from interest networks linked to Iran.
-The weakness of the supporting political environment: al-Zaidi is new and non-political, which grants him some flexibility, but he lacks a strong popular or party base, while his reliance on the consensus of the Coordination Framework (partly loyal to Iran) limits his room to maneuver.
The problem of dependence on Washington: Iraq needs American investment to diversify its economy away from oil, and needs support in confronting the militias. But announcing a date for the US troop withdrawal could be a concession made to appease domestic or Iranian pressure, and raises questions about the extent of long-term American commitment.
Some Iraqi parties believe al-Zaidi can partially confront the Iranian-aligned factions in the short term, thanks to American cover and the anti-corruption campaign that weakens the militias’ financial networks.
The same parties believe, nonetheless, that Khamenei’s funeral in Karbala and Najaf exposed the limits of this capability, showing that Iranian influence remains strong at the popular and political level within the Shiite community, and extends across sects.
Conclusion:
Al-Zaidi’s visit to Washington represents a genuine test for both sides of their ability to confront the post-2003 system, which — through the factions and corruption networks — has become a prime arena of Iranian influence.
The visit comes within the context of the US-Iran confrontation and Washington’s effort to weaken Iran’s hand in Iraq, following its setback in Syria and the exit of the official Lebanese state from Iran’s sphere of influence.
Washington is counting on al-Zaidi, under the supervision of presidential envoy Tom Barrack, to separate Baghdad’s decision-making from Tehran’s guardianship, and to confine weapons in Iraq to the state alone.
While al-Zaidi can rely on Washington to confront the armed factions, announcing a full withdrawal date for US forces from Iraq could weaken his position. If the anti-corruption campaign does not continue seriously enough to reach major figures, the entrenched financial networks and armed factions may resist al-Zaidi’s direction.
Khamenei’s funeral in Najaf and Karbala, with millions of popular participants alongside political leaders from all sects, sent an Iranian message to al-Zaidi and Washington that Tehran’s influence in Iraq endures.
Within the context of the US-Iran confrontation, Washington may intensify its efforts and policies to decouple Iraq’s path from Tehran’s decision-making, following the model of its efforts and sponsorship of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations conducted separately from its negotiations with Iran.
