Al-Burhan’s Escalation Against the U.S. Envoy: Submission to the Influence of Hardline Army and Militia Factions
Zaelnoon Suliman — Policy Assessment, Progress Center for Policies, London
Introduction
The sharp escalation launched by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against U.S. presidential envoy Masad Boulos represents one of the most serious shifts in the interaction between Sudan’s army leadership and international mediation since the outbreak of the war. During a meeting in Port Sudan that included senior commanders of the Armed Forces and high-ranking security leaders, al-Burhan issued a categorical rejection of a proposal presented by the Quad via the U.S. envoy, calling it “the worst paper since the beginning of the war.”
Al-Burhan’s choice of a high-level military platform to deliver this escalation signals an intent to send a simultaneous internal and external message: that the army is prepared to confront any negotiation trajectory it perceives as diminishing its authority or threatening the dominance of the Port Sudan camp over future political and security arrangements in Sudan.
These statements are significant because they came at a sensitive moment immediately after al-Burhan publicly welcomed statements by former U.S. President Donald Trump about efforts to end the war in Sudan, and in the context of Saudi–American attempts to revive a de-escalation track. This apparent contradiction between episodic openness and verbal escalation does not so much indicate inconsistency as expose deep conflicts within the Port Sudan camp, and political and military pressures being exerted on al-Burhan intended to force him into a top-level repositioning that secures their continued centrality in leadership and prevents the unraveling of his alliance with Islamists and allied armed movements.
Al-Burhan’s remarks inflicted a direct blow on Washington and the Quad’s effort to rebuild trust with the army leadership, and opened the possibility that international mediation may falter or shift to alternative tracks that bypass the Quad. The severity of the attack on the U.S. envoy also sends a worrying signal to Washington and regional capitals that Port Sudan is not prepared to accept any negotiating formula that would curtail the army’s influence, restructure the military institution in ways that enable integration of the Rapid Support Forces, or strengthen the role of civilian actors in the transitional landscape.
Accordingly, al-Burhan’s statements are not merely a rejection of a U.S.–Gulf proposal; they carry a direct threat to the momentum of international mediation and raise the likelihood that Sudan could move into a new phase of political deadlock—potentially prolonging the war and entangling the regional environment connected to the Sudanese crisis.
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Analysis
Al-Burhan’s criticism of the U.S. envoy arose in a highly sensitive political and security context within the Port Sudan camp, where a set of structural imbalances threatens the cohesion of the ruling alliance. In the wake of his public welcome of Trump’s remarks, broad anger spread across the Islamist current, armed movements allied with the army, and influential elements inside the Armed Forces itself. These components view any Saudi–American opening as a dangerous step that could revive the Quad’s approach—aimed at curbing Islamist influence, restructuring security institutions, and imposing transitional arrangements that give greater weight to civilian forces or afford the RSF some form of legitimacy.
First, al-Burhan’s escalation can be read as an attempt to contain this internal anger by sending a clear message that the army will not accept any agreement that undermines its role or reduces the influence of Islamists and their partners within the state. The political experience of the Sovereignty Council shows that al-Burhan cannot take pragmatic steps without offering internal guarantees to reassure hardline factions that he remains steadfast in rejecting any negotiating formula that threatens the army’s internal balance or the positions accrued by the Islamic Movement.
Second, the escalation against Boulos constitutes strategic pressure on mediators intended to improve negotiation terms. Although Port Sudan has shown episodic openness to the Saudi–American initiative, it recognizes that any binding political process could deprive it of the ability to control the political and military tempo of the war. By raising the rhetorical stakes, al-Burhan seeks substantive concessions: either amendments to the proposed paper, a freeze of the Quad’s role, or the opening of a bilateral Saudi–U.S. negotiating channel that sidesteps other Quad members and grants the army broader room for maneuver.
Third, accusations aimed at Masad Boulos—that he promotes the RSF narrative and speaks with the UAE’s voice—reflect internal concerns that regional alignments might shift in ways detrimental to the Port Sudan camp. The narrative promoted by army supporters holds that the UAE seeks to entrench RSF influence and that Washington is re-fashioning an approach that sidelines Islamist forces. Al-Burhan leverages this narrative to justify a sterner posture designed to prevent the U.S.–Gulf initiative from becoming a binding process that reproduces power balances unfavorable to the army.
Fourth, the attack on the U.S. envoy also has a tactical dimension tied to fears that the Saudi–American initiative could morph into a political track resembling the 2022–2023 approach—complete with security arrangements for restructuring the armed forces and some form of RSF integration, which Port Sudan views as a red line. Paradoxically, while al-Burhan recognizes the value of Saudi–American cover, he is attempting via escalation to reset the negotiating frame beforehand so the army is not compelled to accept what it regards as “political engineering” aimed at altering existing power balances.
Additionally, the hardline rhetoric aims to signal that the army is not ready to negotiate from a position of weakness and retains military and political capacity to reject any formula inconsistent with its vision for a solution. This message is addressed to both domestic and external audiences and forms part of Port Sudan’s effort to preserve the ruling camp’s unity against potential fissures.
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Conclusions
• Al-Burhan’s escalation does not constitute a fundamental change in Port Sudan’s stance but rather a negotiating maneuver to shape the political frame within which international mediation will operate, preventing the Saudi–American initiative from becoming a binding process that weakens the army.
• The hardline rhetoric is primarily intended to preserve internal cohesion within the Port Sudan camp—including the Islamist current and allied armed movements—by reassuring them that the army will not accept arrangements that erode their positions in the state or grant the RSF political or military legitimacy.
• The escalation against Boulos sends a clear message to international mediators that Port Sudan seeks to reshape the negotiation process on terms that preserve the army’s centrality and limit the Quad’s role, without necessarily withdrawing from the peace track.
• Despite the severity of the rhetoric, negotiations are likely to continue in the near term, but under stricter conditions from the army and with a higher threshold for any settlement that concerns the RSF or the restructuring of the military.
• These developments pose a direct risk to international mediation efforts: escalation could undermine trust between Port Sudan and the Quad and prolong the war in Sudan unless regional and international actors succeed in containing tensions and restoring balance to the political process.
