Al-Burhan Between Islamist Pressures and International Recognition: Reading the Sudan-Azerbaijan Agreement
Policy Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman – Progress Center for Policies – London
Introduction
Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan faces an equation of extraordinary complexity, combining contradictory requirements. He seeks to broaden his circle of international and regional relationships and acquire external legitimacy in the midst of an ongoing war with the Rapid Support Forces that threatens national unity — while remaining captive to the Islamist current’s grip on state institutions and the military. The signing of a mutual diplomatic passport visa exemption agreement with Azerbaijan on May 19, 2026 throws this compound equation into sharp relief and exposes its branching dimensions.
The Facts
The Agreement and Its Immediate Context
The governments of Sudan and Azerbaijan signed an agreement in the Azerbaijani capital Baku for mutual visa exemption for diplomatic passport holders. Sudan’s side was represented by Foreign Minister and International Cooperation Ambassador Mohi al-Din Salem, and Azerbaijan’s by Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov. The agreement appears on its surface to be a routine diplomatic measure, but its timing, the nature of its parties, and its regional context call for a deeper reading.
The Current Sudanese Landscape
Since April 2023, Sudan has been living through a devastating war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces that has produced sharp geographic and political fragmentation and a humanitarian crisis the United Nations has described as among the worst in the world. The Islamic Movement tightens its grip on state institutions and the military establishment, exploiting the war to consolidate its influence and present itself as an indispensable factor in al-Burhan’s political survival equation. Meanwhile, Western pressure on Sudan’s Islamist leadership is intensifying following the United States’ designation of the Sudanese Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization, while active Gulf states have signaled they will tie their support for al-Burhan to conditions including the removal of Islamists from the political scene.
The Context Surrounding the Agreement
The agreement acquires additional strategic dimensions in light of several interlocking factors. Azerbaijan is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The bilateral relationship between the two countries contains no documented extradition treaty. The Sudanese Islamic Movement holds historical ties to Islamic networks in the Caucasus region. At the regional level, credible reports point to the presence of Iranian Revolutionary Guard elements on Sudanese soil, within the context of the historically volatile relationship between Khartoum and Tehran — oscillating between alignment and rupture according to calculations of interest and regional pressure — which lends this agreement an ideological character that goes beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation.
Analysis
Al-Burhan and the Problem of International Legitimacy
Al-Burhan faces a dual legitimacy crisis: domestically, due to the continuation of the war and the absence of any clear political horizon; externally, due to a relative diplomatic isolation imposed by Western pressure for a ceasefire, the removal of Islamists from the political process, and the surrender of former regime leaders to the International Criminal Court. Al-Burhan is working to build an alternative network of relationships that balances Western pressures and provides a margin of maneuver by expanding his international connections — through states that belong neither to the Western bloc nor to the international criminal justice system — as a strategic asset reinforcing his negotiating capacity.
The Agreement as a Multi-Addressed Message
Read more deeply, this agreement carries meanings that go beyond its official content. On one level, it sends a message to Gulf states that Khartoum is working to create channels demonstrating formal distance from Tehran — and facilitating the departure of Iranian elements present on Sudanese soil may fit within this context. On another level, the agreement provides first-tier Islamist Movement leadership with guarantees of safe movement should coming political settlements require their removal from the scene.
The Limits of Al-Burhan’s Room for Maneuver
Al-Burhan’s ability to expand his circle of relationships runs into fundamental structural constraints. The Islamists’ control over state institutions and the military makes any substantive move to remove them a gamble with internal collapse at a moment when he needs military institutional cohesion to confront the Rapid Support Forces. The international community deals with Khartoum as a party to an armed conflict rather than a trusted partner in development and stability projects. The continuation of the war also weakens his negotiating position in any regional or international settlement track, as his fluctuating battlefield position casts a shadow over all his external calculations.
Reading the Significance of the Timing
The agreement was signed against the backdrop of mounting talk of efforts by a quadrilateral or quintet committee to find a political exit from the Sudanese crisis, and al-Burhan is likely seeking to strengthen his negotiating cards before any potential settlement. Expanding his international relationship network — even in non-traditional directions like Azerbaijan — gives the impression that Khartoum is not diplomatically besieged and has alternative options, thereby raising his demands’ ceiling in any coming negotiations.
Possible Scenarios
Scenario One — Managed Settlement: Al-Burhan accepts Arab conditions calling for a gradual removal of Islamists from the political scene in exchange for guaranteed regional support and expanded international recognition. The Azerbaijan agreement becomes part of a system of arrangements providing first-tier leadership with safe exits, while aligning with the quadrilateral or quintet committee’s efforts.
Scenario Two — Continued Balancing: Al-Burhan continues his policy of balancing between the Islamists and external pressures, using his diversified international relationships as leverage against the Islamists without breaking with them — preserving the status quo until the results of the war with the Rapid Support Forces become clearer.
Scenario Three – The Slide Toward Closure: Should the situation on the ground deteriorate, Islamist pressures intensify and tighten their grip, prompting Burhan to abandon any reform trajectory and retreat once again toward Islamist networks as a guarantor of his political survival.
Conclusions:
The Sudan–Azerbaijan agreement signals a diplomatic movement reflecting Burhan’s awareness of the need to broaden his international network in the face of Western diplomatic retreat. However, this movement remains limited in impact unless accompanied by a genuine internal political settlement that addresses the problem of Islamist control over the levers of the state.
Burhan remains trapped in a structural dilemma: he cannot achieve full international recognition without removing the Islamists, yet he cannot remove them without risking the collapse of the entire power structure in the midst of an open-ended war. The agreement with Azerbaijan reveals that he is seeking lateral exits from this dilemma rather than confronting it head-on — an approach that may buy him time, but will not resolve the fundamental contradiction that constrains his ability to build genuine and sustainable international legitimacy.
