A Reading into a Programmed Escalation Path
Policy Brief – Progress Center for Policies
Introduction:
The escalation began days before the sixth round of U.S.-Iran negotiations. It was engineered, calculated, and multifaceted, aiming to establish new rules for the negotiations. This included intensifying various forms of pressure to break the deadlock obstructing a potential agreement.
Key Developments:
Since early June 2025, especially after the 10th, successive signs of an American escalation against Iran have emerged. These signs have taken a military tone just days before the sixth round of negotiations with Iran, set to be held in Muscat on June 15.
U.S. reports indicated intelligence suggesting Israeli preparations to launch a military strike on Iran’s nuclear program.
Reports circulated about relocations and precautionary measures involving U.S. military assets and diplomatic missions in the region—particularly in Iraq.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky revealed that Washington had redirected U.S. munitions from Ukraine to the Middle East.
The IAEA Board of Governors issued a rare condemnation of Iran—the first such move in two decades.
Orders were issued to deploy B2 bombers to Diego Garcia Base in the Pacific Ocean.
Russian sources confirmed U.S. aerial refueling operations over Iraqi airspace.
The U.S. maintained its consistent position at all levels of government: a “zero enrichment” stance on Iran.
It is believed that an agreement was reached between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu during their June 9 phone call to orchestrate a scenario of escalatory intimidation, which began to visibly unfold on June 11.
American sources say Trump is leveraging the Israeli “card,” which has been openly preparing to carry out a significant military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, to reinforce Washington’s hand at the sixth negotiation session in Muscat.
This development suggests Trump has revived the “Israeli option,” which was previously said to have played a role in the dismissal of some administration officials, including National Security Advisor Mike Waltz.
Notably, it was leading American—not Israeli—media outlets that quoted a “U.S. official” claiming Israel was preparing to strike Iran, indicating tacit approval from Washington and no objection from the Trump administration.
This was followed by Israel’s announcement of an emergency security cabinet meeting chaired by Netanyahu on the evening of June 12, adding weight to the “U.S. official’s” claim.
U.S. sources placed CENTCOM’s June 9 announcement—that it had presented Trump with military options to strike Iran’s nuclear program—within a broader context of escalatory developments ahead of the Muscat session.
These sources added that security measures at certain U.S. bases and diplomatic missions—especially in Iraq—were intended to reflect seriousness and readiness for possible military scenarios or retaliatory actions.
Reports suggest the decision to escalate pressure on Iran came days after Trump publicly questioned Iran’s recent shift away from a previously constructive negotiating stance, asking: “What happened to Iran?” Analysts believe the Trump administration needed to display a calculated level of toughness that Tehran and its negotiators would take seriously.
European diplomatic sources highlighted the significance of the IAEA Board of Governors’ June 12 condemnation of Iran’s non-compliance with the nuclear agreement.
These sources noted that the Board had refrained from “disrupting” the Vienna Agreement since 2015, and this latest resolution marks an unprecedented step in 20 years, indicating a shift in global handling of the Iranian file.
While Tehran labeled the Board’s resolution as politicized, neutral sources agreed, noting that the Board had previously avoided condemning Iran despite its failure to explain uranium enrichment traces above 83%. This avoidance was politically motivated to preserve the Biden-era and then Trump-era negotiations. The latest resolution is similarly political and may deeply concern Tehran.
Observers noted that the vote result—19 members supporting condemnation and 14 not supporting (3 against: Russia, China, Burkina Faso; and 11 abstentions)—suggests that room for understanding with Iran remains.
Iran watchers observed visible tension and alarm in Tehran’s response to the resolution. Iran announced the opening of a new enrichment facility and the replacement of fifth-generation centrifuges with sixth-generation ones. Notably, the language used didn’t reflect deliberation (e.g., “We plan to…”), suggesting a reactive and improvised response.
Observers were surprised by the release of documents—reportedly seized from Israel—that Iran claimed prove IAEA Director Rafael Grossi’s collaboration with Israel. Analysts noted that this reaction could alienate a key figure (Grossi) with whom Iran will still need to engage.
Conclusion:
Observers agree that the quasi-military developments suggesting a looming Israeli strike on Iran are still part of a psychological escalation strategy aimed at influencing the June 15 negotiations in Muscat. Should those talks fail, all options—including a destructive Israeli military strike with possible U.S. and Western participation—could become viable.
Some analysts fear that Tehran’s dismissive response—framing U.S. actions as mere psychological warfare—may lead Iranian decision-makers to underestimate the seriousness of Washington’s frustration with the negotiation outcomes.
Sources believe Trump is seeking a quick achievement in the Iran file, and the military posturing is intended to make Tehran perceive the gravity of Washington’s stance on uranium enrichment.
Despite threats and retaliatory rhetoric from Iranian political and military leaders, sources wouldn’t be surprised if Tehran chooses to absorb the escalation and possibly signal flexibility. This would serve to neutralize the “Israeli option” and avoid a costly major war that Iran is economically unprepared for.
It is widely believed that the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution is political and aligns with American pressure, signaling to Tehran that the file may be moving beyond the P5+1 framework toward broader international involvement.
The slim majority in the Board’s vote (19 in favor vs. 11 abstentions/opposition) may serve as a message to Tehran that a negotiated understanding remains possible.
