Dr. Mohamad Kawas, Progress Center for Policies — London
Policy Assessment
Introduction
Reports point to intense diplomatic activity aimed at restructuring relations between Tehran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. These efforts come in the context of pursuing regional stability — particularly regarding the security of the Strait of Hormuz — and are closely linked to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to the region and the ongoing American-Iranian negotiations. These moves raise the question of whether the region is moving toward new security arrangements, or whether these are merely transitional measures to contain the fallout of the current moment.
Key Developments
On June 24, 2026, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan announced he had discussed the latest developments in Tehran-Washington negotiations with his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi, along with progress in implementing prior bilateral understandings.
The same day, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani visited Oman, meeting Sultan Haitham bin Tariq. The two sides discussed arrangements for the future operation and navigation of the Strait of Hormuz, within consultations that included Iran, GCC states, and Iraq.
Informed diplomatic sources confirmed this visit is part of preparations for separate regional talks between Iran and the Gulf states, focusing initially on navigation security and tension reduction, with plans to expand their scope later.
Oman, in coordination with Iran, announced both parties’ commitment to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and safe under international law, with provisional navigational arrangements in place.
Diplomatic reports indicated that Saudi Arabia is a candidate to host a summit bringing together Iran and Gulf states on a track separate from the American-Iranian negotiations, though no official date has been announced.
On June 23, 2026, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, during a visit to Pakistan, proposed the creation of a regional security pact encompassing Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey — while reaffirming that Iran’s missile program is non-negotiable.
The same day, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared Iran’s readiness to conclude security agreements with Gulf states and deepen economic cooperation.
Sources following these developments linked them to Secretary Rubio’s visit, which began June 23 and covered the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain, where he participated in meetings with Gulf leaders and a GCC session.
Rubio affirmed during the visit that the US is “completely aligned” with its Gulf partners on dealing with Iran, and that talks addressed navigational security in the Strait of Hormuz and guaranteeing Gulf state security.
Earlier, on June 10, 2026, the GCC had warned that Iranian attacks undermine trust and close doors to dialogue, with Secretary-General Jasem Albudaiwi noting that a large portion of recent Iranian strikes had targeted member states.
Political Analysis
These developments reveal that current moves are not limited to improving bilateral relations between Iran and certain Gulf states — they aim at building a regional framework for managing security risks, foremost among them Strait of Hormuz navigation, on a track separate from (though politically linked to) the American-Iranian process.
Gulf roles appear to be complementary rather than competitive: Oman and Qatar continue their traditional mediating roles, leveraging their stable relations with Tehran, while Saudi Arabia moves toward serving as a political umbrella for the new track by potentially hosting a summit that would lend it regional legitimacy and momentum — drawing on the 2023 Beijing agreement that restored Saudi-Iranian relations.
Gulf state priorities nonetheless remain divergent. Some focus on obtaining security guarantees — halting support for Iran-aligned factions, curbing the missile program, securing freedom of navigation — while others prioritize de-escalation and economic cooperation. Yet this divergence does not appear to prevent continued collective coordination within the GCC.
Iranian moves suggest an attempt to leverage the openings created by Washington negotiations to expand the circle of regional understandings, while carefully excluding the most sensitive files — above all the missile program. This reflects Tehran’s desire to separate maritime security and economic cooperation from strategic military issues.
The linkage between these moves and Rubio’s visit signals that Washington does not oppose Gulf outreach to Iran, but seeks to ensure it proceeds within understandings aligned with US security interests — particularly protecting international navigation and preventing any arrangements that might diminish its role in Gulf security.
Conclusions
Current diplomatic activity reveals an active regional track aimed at restructuring the Iran-GCC relationship in parallel with American-Iranian negotiations — not as a substitute for them.
Rubio’s visit and the high level of US-Gulf coordination reflect a shared framework for managing openness toward Iran in ways that protect Western and Gulf security interests.
The complementary roles of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar — technical mediation alongside political sponsorship — increase the track’s chances of success if conditions allow.
Ultimately, success depends heavily on the outcome of American-Iranian negotiations and both sides’ ability to offer credible guarantees on navigation security, missiles, and relations with regional allies.
Despite current diplomatic momentum, the trust deficit stemming from recent confrontations remains the primary obstacle to moving from de-escalation measures toward sustainable security arrangements.
Iranian leadership statements provide a basis for dialogue, but do not in themselves constitute a guarantee of long-term commitment, given continuing divergence on the most sensitive security issues.
It remains too early to conclude that any Gulf-Iranian reconciliation will automatically extend to Yemen, Lebanon, or Iraq — those arenas will remain bound by more complex local and regional calculations.
If this track evolves into a regional security system encompassing Iran, Gulf states, Iraq, and potentially Turkey and Pakistan, it would redraw regional security balances — and might constrain Israel’s aspirations to play a pivotal security role in the region. This scenario, however, remains contingent on Washington’s position and the limits of its readiness to support such a shift.
