The Khashoggi Crisis: Turkey Champions over the Muslim Brotherhood and its Allies
The Khashoggi Crisis: Turkey Champions over the Muslim Brotherhood and its Allies.
By the Center for Arab Progress
Translated from Arabic by the Center for Arab Progress
The killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate, in Istanbul has led to political confusion, focusing global attention to the Middle East region. However, the majority of confusion lies in Turkey’s position towards this crisis. Committing a crime of this complexity on Turkish soil has put the country’s reputation to the test, in particular, questioning the international system’s confidence in the effectiveness of state institutions and specifically, the integrity of the Turkish judicial system. Weeks into Khashoggi’s disappearance, the Turkish government raised alarming concern as to the whereabouts of Khashoggi, primarily outlining the watchful eye of Turkish intelligence over Saudi movements within its borders, although it had not been implicated to conduct such procedures as a result of explicit convictions.
This is in addition to the Turkish government’s management of this diplomatic and judicial crisis with a high level of professionalism, sophistication and responsibility. Most evidently, President Erdogan’s meticulous administration of this crisis, in addition to the attached diplomatic and ethical crises unfolding as a result. Ankara avoided escalation from the outset, which included any halting of diplomatic or other relations, despite the brazen obstruction for Turkish sovereignty. The parallel Turkish state’s early realization of the crime did not prompt extending accusation to include the Saudi royal family, a government, a monarch or the crown prince, realizing this would inflict deep wounds on Turkish -Saudi relations, in addition to the latter’s allies in the Arab world; in addition to dragging catastrophic damage to the Saudi Kingdom’s religious, political and economic status internationally. According to official statistic, Saudi investment within Turkey exceeds $8 billion annually, in addition to trade exchange that is close to that figure, consequently, tensions in state relations would be followed a deterioration in relations with traditional, Saudi allies in the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Within his address, Erdogan maintained a state of balance and consistency in Turkish- Saudi relations, although maintained margin to exerting political pressure on Riyadh and its top ally, Washington. Khashoggi’s murder presents a window of opportunity to undermine the status of the Crown Prince, without affecting the status of the King, the custodian of the two holy mosques.
Erdogan successfully championed external and internal figures affected negatively by Mohammed bin Salman’s aggressive political policies.
The latter’s harsh treatment of Turkish obstruction for Saudi sovereignty globally included Turkey establishing the ‘Suakin’ military base in Sudan, utilising funding by the state of Qatar, along the shores of the Red Sea, and later with the establishment of the al -Rayyan military base within Qatar, threatening Saudi national security.
Equally importantly are Ankara -Cairo strained relations, as a result of the latter’s pointing accusations that Turkey supports extremist Jihadist organizations within the Mt. Sinai region and within Libya, which echoes Saudi threats. Saudi Arabia is additionally concerned over Turkish incursion into Somalia and Djibouti, signalling the latter’s expansionist agenda into the Horn of Africa region, playing highly critically into Saudi Arabia’s state of affairs, once placed in the wider context of gulf competition over this emerging region in the world.
Equally, Ankara has not been able to bypass Saudi Arabia’s support for ousting Brotherhood-elected President Mohamed Morsi, which has prompted Mohamed bin Salman’s political and financial support to the regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This coupled with Gulf crackdown on Qatar, Turkey’s primary ally within the Middle East region, coincides with Mohamed bin Salman’s policies targeting the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab region, going as far as classifying the movement as a terrorist organisation.
Combined, such factors appear to formulate strong motivation for the Turkish president to personally target Mohammed bin Salman, utilising the ensued crisis to weaken and diminish his image and role within the Saudi kingdom. Nevertheless, Erdogan’s statement addresses the effectiveness of King Salman, describing him as the ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,’ as reassurance that Ankara would not be challenging Riyadh to the leadership of the Muslim world.
In this light, Erdogan’s statement recurrently stressed that Khashoggi’s killing had been pre-orchestrated, although he ironically refrained from pointing accusations to the Crown Prince, perhaps due to Erdogan’s apprehension he may be unable to oust Mohamed bin Salman from his duties due to his accumulated influence within political, economic, defence, security and other influential arenas.
In this light, Mohamed bin Salman has led a distinctive and unprecedented agenda, which has involved mass arrests of a number of influential princes, as part of a wider campaign to address corruption within the house of Saud. This is in addition to bin Salman transforming into an idol figure for youth, that dream of reform in the direction of modernism and change, hoping to bring the Saudi kingdom into the contemporary context.
There had been widespread disappointment crippling the Islamist world, as a result of Erdogan’s reaction towards the Khashoggi case. There was hope that Turkish -Saudi tension would drive Erdogan towards isolating Saudi Arabia and its defacto rulers, labelling them as rogue states, to serve Saudi agendas.
Erdogan has managed the crisis of the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, in accordance with the mentality of an established regional state, which has maintained all options open. Turkish -Saudi relations appear untarnished, as desired by established, Arab, Bedouin machinations. This has been facilitated by mutual interests, a joint historical dimension combining both states has served this purpose well, as well as the full cooperation of Saudi Arabia and the transparent accountability of officials involved within this crime.
In an attempt to understand the discourse of the Arab branch of the Muslim Brotherhood discourse, and towards consolidating a broader understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political agenda that is targeting Erdogan, there’s a broader scope extending beyond the political one. Turkey’s nationalist leader, Ataturk, declared the end of the Islamic caliphate, which coincided with the call for Arab nationalism at the Paris conference of 1920, where Arab countries advocated for nationalist identity under the discourse of the modern state, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Uncoincidentally, this discourse contributed to a parallel set of norms set out by Hassan al Bana, the father of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, that centred on the revival of the Islamic Caliphate. Observers over the scene have noticed that the revival of Islamist parties, particularly with Necmettin Erbekan and the Happiness party, in addition to Erdogan’s more charismatic leadership and the newly polished image of the Justice and Democratic Party has provided the Muslim Brotherhood a window to revive their ideology through them, completely disregarding this historical context and the more important role of Sufism attached to Turkish Islamist movements.
The Turkish nationalist leader Ataturk declared the end of the Islamic caliphate, and the Arab nationalists at the Paris Conference in 1920 established their first statement calling for the independence of the Arab countries, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Calling for the revival of the Islamic Caliphate, and formed the subject of the main lift in the program of Hassan al-Banna in 1928.
In an attempt to understand the absurdity of the Arab brotherhood discourse specifically and the incitement that goes beyond Khashoggi’s murder, to reach the attack on the Turkish president, who disappointed them in his last speech. The Turkish nationalist leader Ataturk declared the end of the Islamic caliphate. The Arab nationalists at the Paris Conference in 1920 established their first statement calling for the independence of the Arab countries, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. While the Islamic discourse was founded on the call to revive the Islamic caliphate, and formed the subject of the main lever in the program of Hassan al-Banna in 1928. Further, the followers of the Islamic movements took notice that since the return of Necmettin Erbakan in the Party of Happiness, the new version of AK and Erdogan’s charismatic personality, the Arab Brotherhood Movement revived the idea of the caliphate and warn Turkey and its leader its cloak and dreams. This is without any account of historical circumstances or even a deep understanding of the mystical roots of Turkish Islam (Nawras).
With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the Arabic scene developed distaste for Turkey’s adoption of Islamist currents, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood. Although this has been driven by Turkey’s interests in supporting political Islamist currents for economic and political reasons. Nevertheless, ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood have surpassed Turkish agendas into developing radical roles within Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen and Libya, it increased the sanctity of “the savior of the nation and protector of its successor,” Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Although the President and a number of his aides have stated more than once that the context of the secular Turkish state is different from the one exercised in Arab world, one of his advisers openly expressed his anger at the attempts of the Arab Brotherhood to transfer their failed experiences to his country. This explains the frustration of the Arab factions of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and their continuing their abhorrent campaign in various directions, which targets Saudi Arabia primarily under Mohammed bin Salman. Observers suggest this may be a political campaign to establish a father and protecting figure for Arabic members of the Brotherhood, following their failed attempts to establish a sphere of political influence within each Arabic capital. Although there is no established link Between the Muslim Brotherhood and the murder of Khashoggi, nor with tolerant Islamist currents, the movement would seek to capitalise on this case at any cost, an attempt to seek power within this context. The Qatari -Saudi dispute remains a ticket abused by the Arabic Brotherhood Movement, to capitalise on indefinitely; typically this may keep the truth hidden for the time being.
https://www.arabprogress.org/2018/10/26/%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%87%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88/
